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CHAPI'ER I
THE INCIDENT

On February 15. 1779. Gerard. the French minister to the United
States officially notified the Continental Congress that it was the
"desire of His Most Christian Majesty that the United States would
speedily put themselves in a condition to

take that part in the nego-

tiation for peace which their dignity and interest required."

He added

that they should "lay a solid foundation for obtaining a speedy peace"
by "giving their plenipotentiary the most ample instructions and full
powers." 1
Although Congress took prompt action on the French suggestion
and received a committee report "as to conditions of pacification and
particularly as to the Mississippi and Fisheries"2 on February 23. it
was not until August 14 that "the Instructions for a. treaty of peace
with Great Brita.in"3 were finally agreed upon.

The debate in Congress

had been long and difficult; it had been fiercely sectional and had
indicated that future American-French relations were not to be smooth.
First, there was the .;,assissippi question.

Throughout 1778,

the United States and Spain had been angling for control of the

L

~barton. Francis, The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the
United States, The Government Printing Office, Washington. 1889; III,
49-50.
2Ibid., III, 58.
3Ibid., III, 300.

2

Mississippi.

Since France desired an alliance with both Spain and the

United States, at first she took no part in their dispute.

But by

October of 1778, Gerard, the French minister, departed from the position
of disinterested criticism of the two countries' claims and
avowed champion of the cause of Spain.

bec~~e

the

This is somewhat understandable

because, as Edward Corwin has pointed out, a Frenchman was prone to
regard England's claim to the Mississippi--and hence the claim of the
United States--as founded upon conquest alone.4

Gerard knew that

Vergennes desired Spain's assistance in the prosecution of the war
against England, and he had little understanding of, and no sympathy
with, the .American claims as they were represented in Congress.

So it

was that on January 28, 1779, Gerard reported to Vergennes that he had
infor~med

the Americans that the French government no longer accepted

the American pretensions in the West.5
Disagreement about the :Mississippi was but one phase of the
peace problem.

Whether the United States should propose participation

in the Newfoundland fisheries as a sine

sua~

Britain was the other moot question, and its
debates for four months.

of the peace with Great

determination caused heated

Gerard found himself drawn into this dispute

also, and he entered with a great show of passion.

On May 14, 1779, he

....o===--....--"')

4Corwin, Edward S., French Policy ~ the A.rnerican Alliance, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, Conn., 1916, 246.
5Circourt, Histoire de l'Alliance, III. 264-6. Quoted by Corwin, Ibid.,
253.
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reports to Vergennes:
I told them that I was convinced that
England would grant them the fisheries
by the same title as that by which they
had previously held them, to wit, as
subjects of the British crown, but that
they had no need of the aid of France
for that arrangement.6
F'aced with the threat of civil war or secession if New England was
opposed in her fisheries, Gerard bluntly informed Congress that "if the
Americans had the audacity to reduce His Majesty to the necessi'bJ of
choosing between the two lSpain and the United States), his decision
would not be in favor of the United States ••• (and) that certainly the
king would not consent to consume the rest of his realm through a
succession of years in order to procure a small increase of fortune for
a few Uew England shipowners."7
Confronted with such vigorous representations the New England
delegates agreed not to insist upon the fisheries as a

~

the peace, but they were careful to have John Adams of

f~ssachusetts

appointed as peace commissioner.

qua

~

of

Despite a rhetorical condemnation of

the fisheries which he had made in the past,8 Ad~ms was to prove himself
a dependable protagonist for the interests of New England.9
The appointment of John Adams could have been justified by many
6Doniol, Henri, Histoire de la Participation de la France a l'ltablissement des Etats-Unis d'Amlrique, CorresvondenoeDiplomatique et Documents,
Imprl.inei=ie Uationale, Paris, 1892, IV, 138.
7Ibid., III, 177-81.
8Ada~s, John, Works, edited by Charles Francis Adams, Little Brown and
Company, Boston, 1856, VII, 47.
9Ibid. III 263.
\-
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arguments.

He had returned from a diplomatic mission in France but two

months before.

From this mission, as Carl Van Doren expresses it, he

had "honestly recom1nended himself out of office. nlO At this time,
Adams carried with him a letter of commendation from the French foreign
minister, Vergennes:
Although you are to be henceforth without a
public character in France, be persuaded that
the esteem and consideration which you have
justly acquired are by no means diminished,
and I flatter myself, sir, that you will not
deprive me of the pleasure of assuring you of
it by word of mouth, and being at the s~~e time
the interpreter of the favorable sentiments
with which the king honors you. They are the
consequences of the particular satisfaction
which his majesty has received from the wise
conduct you have held during the whole tLme of
your commission.ll
Ada~s's

beyond question.

patriotism, honesty and courage were absolutely
Despite his egoism, as Bernard

F~~

says, "it would have

been hard to find a more educated or perspicacious man.nl2 Although he
lacked solid diplomatic training, there was no other possible choice who
had been better trained.

Indeed, so wise did the choice appear that

immediately following his selection, Adams received flattering letters
from Gerr.y and Lovell and a most gracious note from La Luzerne.l3
lOvan Doren, Carl, Benjamin Franklin, Garden City Publishing Co., Inc.
New York City, 1938, 608.
llWharton, ~· cit., III, 55.
12Fii.Y., Bernard,""Fra.nklin, ~Apostle of Modern Times, Little Brown and
Company, Boston, 1929, 441.
13Wharton, op. cit., III, 352.
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On November 13, 1779, Adams sailed from Boston on the French
frigate, Sensible, with his two sons, John Quincy and Charles.

He had a

most unpleasant journey, and when the leaky Sensible put into the port
of Ferrel, Adams decided to make the rest of his way overland.

His

diary contains the rueful account of the hard journey through Spain,
where, to the disgruntled Yankee, "nothing appears rich but the churches;
nothing fat but the clergy."l4
Adams had hardly arrived in the French capital before he sent
Vergennes the startling communication that he considered it his duty to
inform the British government that he was in Europe to conclude treaties
of peace and trade.

In the year which had elapsed since the French had

suggested that America send a plenipotentiary for peace with England,
the fortunes of the war had changed.

Vergennes feared that Adams's

announcement would indicate to the British that America was no longer so
desirous of continuing the war and that it would induce the British to
make new overtures to win over the peace bloc in the Continental Congress.
Anticipating the objection that the time was not ripe for the
announcement of the purpose of his mission, Adams had prefaced his
request by saying:
From conversation with gentlemen at Boston,
who were members of Congress, and from private
letters, I learned in general that it (the
decision to send a commissioner for peace) was
not of a~ sudden deliberation or the fruit of
any particular event of the war, prosperous or
14Adams, Works, III, 244.
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adverse, but a measure that had been more than
a year under consideration.l5
Then he had continued by urging the following questions which were so
unwelcome to Vergennes and which more than anything else produced the
awkward situation that followed.
(1) Whether in the present state of things,
it is prudent in me to acquaint the British
ministr,y that I am arrived here, and that I
shall be ready to treat whenever the belli~erent powers shall be inclined to treat.
(2) Whether it is prudent in me to publish
in any manner more than the journals of
Congress may have already done the nature
of my mission.
(3) Or whether to remain on the reserve, as
I have hitherto done since my arrival in
Europe.l6
In answering these questions Vergennes fell back upon an introductor,y remark of Adams, in which Adams had admitted: "As I was not at
Congress when this transaction Cthe choosing of the plenipotentiar,y)
took place, I am not able to inform your excellency
the rise and progress of it."l7
to different points on

~ich

ve~

particularly of

Vergennes said, "I think, before I reply

you consulted me, that it is proper to wait

for the arrival of M. Gerard, because he is probably the bearer of your
instructions, and will certainly be able to make me better acquainted with
the nature and extent of your commission."l8
counseled conceaLment.
15Wharton, op. cit., III, 492.
16Ibid., III; 492-3.
l1Ibfd., III, 492.
l8Ibid., III, 496.

In general, however, he

7

To Adams, concealment was distasteful, and the French refusal
to accept his statement of the nature of his mission, together with the
belief that Gerard would have more detailed and more accurate information about it, seemed to be an insult to a sovereign nation.

Two

excerpts from the eight items of comment which Adams added to his diar,y
in regard to this incident show how deeply he felt about the matter:
The instructions of a sovereign to his
ambassador are a secret and confidential communication between them; a
sacred deposit, committed by the master
to the servant, which the latter is
under the strongest ties of honor,
fidelity, and conscience, to preserve
inviolate, until he has an express
permission or injunction to reveal it.
The Count had probably instructed M.
Gerard by some means or other, to penetrate
into the secrets of Congress, and obtain
from some of the members, or some of the
secretaries or clerks, copies of the most
confidential communications between
Cdngress and their ministers.l9
During the next fewmonths Adams repeatedly urged the publication of the nature of his mission.
a blow from a light lash.

Each request was to Vergennes like

He told Adams that he would announce in the

Gazette of France that Adams had arrived "to assist at the conferences
for a peace when that event shall take place,"20 but later told him that
19Adams, Works, III, 261-2.
20Wharton, op. ~·· III, 580.
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he had not known that such announcements were never made in this publication.

He then assured him that it would be quickly published in the

Mercure de It,rance.
On

June

16~

1780 their relations were subject to a series of

events which made them more and more strained.

On this day, Adams sent

to Vergennes a Boston newspaper, which he had received from a friend.
In it there was an account of a Congressional bill "establishing an
annual tax for seven years, for the redemption of their part of the bills
payable in silver and gold at the market price in hard money. n21
contented himself

~th

the above words of explanation.

Adams

Since the bill

provided that 97 cents out of a dollar would be defaulted, Vergennes
viewed the bill quite differently.

His criticism of it was quite justi-

fiably severe, but at times it became offensive.

He wrote Adams:

It appears that the assembly of Massachusetts
has determined to adopt the resolutions of
Congress fixing the value of the paper money
at forty for one of specie •••• While I admit,
sir, that the assembly might have recourse to
the expedient above mentioned in order to remove
their load of debt, I am far from agreeing that
it is just or agreeable to the ordina~ course
of things to extend the effect to strangers as
well as citizens of the United States.... I
will only add that the French, if they are
obliged to submit to the reduction of Congress,
will find themselves victims of their zeal, and
I may say of the rashness with which they exposed
themselves in furnishing the Americans with arms,
ammunition, and clothing; and, in a word, with
all things of the first necessity of which the
Americans stood in need. You will agree with me,
sir, that this is not what the subjects of the
king ought to expect; and that, after escaptng

9

the dangers of the sea, the vigilance of
the English, instead of dreading to see
them plundered in America they ought, on
the contrary, to expect the thanks of
Congress and of all the Americans, and
believe that their property will be as
secure and sacred in America as in France
itself.22
Vergennes added that La Luzerne had orders to make the
strongest representations to Congress against the bill.

Adams wrote

immediately to Franklin and urged him to attempt to have Vergennes's
orders stopped.

He then appealed to Vergennes to withhold his orders

until he, Adams, could write a defense of the Congressional action.
ve~J

That

night he sent off to Vergennes a long dissertation justifying the

American monetary policy.
His principal arguments were:

11

No foreign merchant ought to

expect to be treated in America better than her native merchants."
reminded Vergennes that France was suffering no monetary loss in
supporting America in the war:
The flourishing state of her (France's)
marine and commerce, and the decisive
influence of her councils and negotiations
in Europe, which all the world will allow
to be owing in a great measure to the
separation of America from her inveterate
enemy and to her new connections with the
United States, show that the obligations
are mutual.
And finally, he takes up Vergennes own words when he says:
I can not excuse myself from adding that
most of the arms, ammunition, and clothing
22Ibid., III, 806-7.

He
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for the army have been contracted for here
by the ministers of Congress~ and paid for~
or agreed to be paid for~ here in silver and
gold. Ve~J little of these articles have
been shipped by private adventurers. They
have much more commonly shipped articles of
luxury of which the country did not stand in
need, and upon which they must have made vast
profits.23
Meanwhile~

F'ranklin had sent Vergennes

11

a request in conse-

quence of an application" made to him by Adams that the orders should
be

suspended~

"as that plenipotentiary is able to prove that those

orders are founded on false reports."24 Vergennes in answering Franklin
referred to Adams's last letter quite disparagingly:
Mr. Adams. on the 22d, sent me a long dissertation on the subject in question, but it
contains only abstract reasonings,hypotheses,
and calculations whiCh have no real foundation,
or which at least do not apply to the subjects
of the king, and in fine principles. than which
nothing can be less analogous to the alliance
subsisting between his majesty and the United
States.25
The "pretended proofs"26 of Adams did nothing to change
Vergennes's opinions.

Indeed Vergennes wrote to Franklin that "the

king is so firmly persuaded.

sir~

that your opinion ••• differs from that

of lJir. Adams that he is not apprehensive of laying you under aey
embarrassments by requesting you to support the representations which
23Ibid.
1
24Ibid.,
25Ibid. ~
26Ibid ••

III,
III,
III,
III,

809-16.
827.
827.
827.
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his minister is ordered to make to Congress."27

To Adams, Vergennes wrote,

"I think. all further discussion on this subject will be needless."28
The fragile relations between Vergennes and Adams were not
strengthened by Franklin's letter to Vergennes.

Franklin assured

Vergennes that the sentiments of Congress "and those of the Americans in
general, with regard to the alliance ••• differ widely from those that seem
to be expressed by Mr. Adams in his letter to your excellency."29
At this point it is interesting to consider the footnote which
Francis Wharton appended in his edition of the above letter of Franklin.
It condemns Franklin for being over-severe: "Adams' letter to Vergennes
of June 22, 1780, while it takes untenable ground as to the standard by
which government debts are to be paid, only by implication shows
unfriendly feeling to France."30

Franklin, however, in condemning

Adams's views "with regard to the alliance" itself, put his fellow
diplomat in a very bad light with the French court.
Such a letter from Franklin was particularly inopportune for
Ad~~s,

because Vergennes, at this time, seems to have been influenced

by some indiscreet remarks Adams had made to subordinate officials of
the French foreign office.

On June 17, 1780, Adams had taken a defiant

stand on the touchy question of the Congressional monetary policy:
27Ibid.,
28Ibid.,
291bid.,
30Ibid.,

III,
III,
III I
III,

827.
828.
844.
844, n.
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The course Congress had taken was wise,
indeed very wise, just very just; and
those who complained of it were either
English emissaries or spies.... The
French had less reason for complaint
than anybody else.31
Again, on May 9, 1780, in assuring Genet that he thought the alliance
solidly founded, Adams showed a surprising lack of deference to the
French will.
To suppose that France is sick of the
part she has taken is to suppose her
to be sick of that conduct which has
procured her more respect and consideration in Europe than any step she ever
took.... It is to suppose her sick of
that system which has broken off from
her rival and natural enemy the most
solid part of his strength; a strength
that had become so terrible to France and
would have been so fatal to her.32
Such language of the undiplomatic Adams induced Vergennes to
read more hostility to French interests into Adams's letter than it
really contained.

Consequently, the show of suspicion on the part of

Vergennes awakened real distrust in Adams in the French foreign office.
Unfortunately, Adams did not stop writing his disturbing letters.
On July 13, 1780 Adams discussed the naval efforts of France in

the war, when he penned Vergennes "a few observations upon the present
conjuncture of affairs. ".33

In order to cut off effectively the British

line of supply, he urged that the French fleet be maintained throughout
3ltoniol, op. cit., IV, 416, n.
32vfuarton, ~· cit., III, 667.
33Ibid., II~ 848-55.
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the winter at "Boston, Rhode Island, Delaware, or Chesapeake Bay."34
Perhaps this was sound strategy, but if the United States decided that
it was necessary to suggest to the French how they might more effec•
tively use their fleet, it was the province of Franklin to do this.
I'lforeover Adams incorporated into his letter some offensive animadversions.

He was careful to quote an English propaganda squib which

read:
Let the whole system o£ F.rance be considered
from the beginning down to the retreat from
Savannah, and I think it is impossible to
put any other construction upon it but this,
viz., that it has always been the deliberate
intention and object of France, for purposes
of their own, to encourage the continuation
of the war in America in hopes of exhausting
the strength and resources of this country
and of depressing the rising power of America.35
And Adams comments upon thia idea as if there might be a foundation in
fact for it:
If these 'contrary opinions should be suffered
to gain ground, as they most assuredly will
if something is not done to prevent it, when
all the world sees and declares as they do
that it is the best policy o£ France, if she
considered her own interest alone in the
conduct of the war, to keep a superior naval
force upon the coasts of the continent of
North America, I leave your excellency to
judge what a melancholy effect it will have
upon our affairs.36
Before Vergennes answered this letter of Adams, Adams determined to

run a tilt at Vergennes from another quarter.

He decided to

the letter Vergennes had sent him five months before regarding
34Ibid., III, 848-55,
challe~e

3Bro"ra.
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concealment of the full nature of his mission.

First he quoted

vergennes's letter; then he appended eleven comments which he thought
the subject required.

He began his remarks

I should have been ver,y happy if your
excellency had hinted at the reasons
which were in your mind, because after
reflecting upon this subject as maturely
as I can, I am not able to collect any
reasons which appear to me sufficient
for concealing the nature of my pow&rs in
their full extent from the court of London.
On the contrar.y, many arguments have occurred
to me which seem to show it to be both the
policy of the United States and my particular duty to communicate them.37
Ten reasons follow.
Then, while Vergennes had not yet received Adams's last
letter, Vergennes wrote assuring Adams that "The Chevalier de Ternay
and the Count de Rochambeau are sent with the express design which is
the subject of your letter."

As if in answer to the British squib,

he added, "You will perceive, sir, by this detail, that the king is
far from abandoning the cause of America and that His Majesty without
having been solicited by Congress, has taken effectual measures to
support the cause of America. "38
In answer to this letter, on the very next day, Adams enthusiastically and spontaneously responded: "I assure Your Excellency that
scarcely any news I ever heard gave me more satisfaction. "3 9 But Adams's
37Ibid., III, 861-3.
3~Ibid., III, 870•1.
39Ibid., III, 872.
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response was such only because he had not given due attention to the letter.

On July 25, 1780 Vergennes gave a complete answer to Adams's
request relative to the publication of the nature of his mission.

Feelings

were not spared;tact was not used in exposing the position of the French
ministry; the answer was vitriolic.

Adams was informed that "to be soli-

citous about a treaty of commerce before peace is established is like being
busy about furnishing a house before the foundation is laid.rr40

The result

of the publication would but "give credit to the opinion ••• that the United
States incline towards a defection." 41

To propose what Adams did would be

"to propose what was chimerical, and would be taking a step which it [the
English ministry] would hold in derision.n42

Vergennes found it necessary

to point out to Adams that "the English ministry would consider that communication as ridiculous. " 43 He found he had to warn Adams that "The
English ministry would either return no answer, or if they did, it would
be an insolent one.

In case of the latter, why should a man needlessly

expose himself to insult, and thereby make

hL~self

the laughing-stock of

all the nations?"44
In commenting on the eighth of the eleven arguments of Adams,
Vergennes at last seems to find something to praise, but the praise only
makes the rest of the letter the more bitter to Adams.
"This is a sensible reflection.
40 Ibid., IV, 3-6.
41Ibid.
42Ibid.
43Ibid.
44Ibid.

-

Vergennes begins:

It proves that Mr. Adams is himself

16
convinced that there are circumstances.whioh may induce him to conceal
his powers."45

Finally Vergennes asks the self-respecting Adams to "do

the ministr,y of Madrid the justice to believe that they will have sagacity. n46 All things considered., Vergennes treated Adams like an ignorant
school-boy whose ignorance was causing him to make a fool of himself.
Adams must have been chagrined by this letter., but he began
his answer to Vergennes quite humbly; he promised to "suspend" any
communication with the British ministr,y.
sentence., "Your

e~cellency's

But after a rather cryptic

arguments, or indeed your authority., will

probably be sufficient to satis~ these people [congress] and to
justi~

me.," he becomes more argumentative.

He has just spoken of "the

due deference" which will be shown to the sentiments of the ministry of
France.

Now he begins a direct refutation of Vergennes arguments by

saying., "This deference., however., by no means extends so far as to agree
in all cases to those sentiments without examination."47
On July 27., 1780., the very next day., Adams "observed one
expression" of Vergennes's other letter which he thought it his "duty to
consider more particularly."48

Vergennes had said that His Majesty's

action had not been solicited by Congress.
length that such was not the case.
4 5Ibid.

46I'bi<r.

4'7Ibid • ., IV., 7-10.
48!bid., IV, 12-14.

Adams undertook to prove at

Congress first made a request for

17
this aid as early at 1776 and had repeated the request several times.
This was too much for Vergennes.
He no longer restrained his anger.

On the 29th of

July~

1780,

he wrote a stinging letter to Adams and severed relations between the two.
'When I took upon myself to give you a mark
of my confidence by informing you of the
destination of Messrs. de Ternay and
Rochambeau~ I did not expect the animadversions which you have thought it your
duty to make.... To avoid any further
discussions of that sort, I think it my
duty to inform you that, Mr. Franklin being
the sole person who has letters of credence
to the king from the United States~ it is
with him only that I ought and can treat of
matters which concern them, and particularly
of that which is the subject of your observations.
Besides~ sir, I ought to observe to you
that the passage in my letter which you
thought it your duty to consider more particularly ••• had nothing further in vi&W
than to convince you that the king did not
stand in need of your solicitations to
induce him to interest himself in the
affairs of the United States.49
A few days after receiving this letter Adams withdrew to
Holland.

Vergennes

co~municated

with Franklin and sent him copies of

the correspondence which he had had with Adams.

He requested Franklin

to transmit them to Congress "that they may judge whether he is
as Congress no doubt

desires~

endowed~

with that conciliating spirit which is

necessary for the important and delicate business with which he is .
49 Ib·d

__:__., IV 16-17.
I

18
entrusted • 50
We shall conclude our account of the incident of the "teasing
of Mr. Adams'' with Franklin's summation of it in his report to Congress:
Mr. Adams has given offense to the court here
by same sentiments and expressions contained
in several of his letters written to the
Count de Vergennes. I mention this with
reluctance, though perhaps it would have been
my duty to acquaint you with such a circumstance, even were it not required of ~e by
the minister himself.... Mr. Adams did not
show me his letters before he sent them ••••
It is true that Mr. Adams's proper business
is elsewhere •••• He thinks, as he tells me
himself, that America has been too free in
expressions of gratitude to France, for that
she is more obliged to us than we to her, and
that we should show spirit in our applications.
I apprehend that he mistakes his ground ••••
IJI. de Vergennes, who appears much offended,
told me yesterday that he would enter into no
further discussions with Mr. Adams, nor answer
any more of his letters. He is gone to Holland
to try, as he told me, whether something might
not be done to render us less dependent on
France.Sl
50ro La Luzerne, August 7, 1780.
51Wharton, op. ~·, IV, 21-25.

Doniol, op. ~·· IV, 424, n.

CHAPI'ER II
THE INFLUENCE OF l'JATIONJJ.. A.lm

RE~LIGIOUS

PREJill)ICE

In the previous chapter we have seen that Adams ensnarled
himself in a troublesome and, to some extent at least, an unnecessary
imbroglio.

It is our purpose now to consider the causes of this

diplomatic entanglement.
It is impossible for us to view Adams's dispute with Vergennes
as did his grandson, Charles Francis Adams.

Charles

Ada~s

based his

argument upon Vergennes 1 s instructions to Genet: "to assure ]'J[r. Adams
that it would always give him pleasure to be supplied by him [AdamsJ
with intelligence from good sources touching American affairs."l

Charles

Adams concluded that his grandfather merely supplied such information
and followed normal diplomatic procedure.

The rupture was due entirely

to French duplicity, whetted by the unsympathetic utilitarianism of
Franklin.

Such an explanation falls before the simple fact that normal

diplomatic procedure should have told Adams that both discretion and
courtesy called for his holding himself strictly aloof from everything
which did not concern the object of his mission.

It should have told

him that Franklin was the United States' i.1inister to France, while Adams
lAdams, John, Works, 2.E,• cit., I, 314.
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was accredited only to negotiate treaties of peace and commerce with
England.
But the explanation with which we wish to concern ourselves
in this chapter differs

~

coelo from that of Charles Adams.

that proposed by Henri Doniol, a prime authority regarding

It is

Franco-~~erican

relations during the Revolution, of whom Edward Corwin wrote, "For an
American student, with limited time at his disposal, to attempt an
investigation of the Archives (of the French Department of Foreign
Affairs) without a thorough acquaintance with Doniol to begin with,
would be deliberately to incur the risk of one-sided and ill-considered,
however, surprising, results."2
Doniol places the blame for the diplomatic complication in the
virulent anti-Gallic hatred of John Adams.

Although no

~

professo treat-

mentis accorded the motives of John Adams, Doniol again and again
expresses his conclusions about them as he describes the incident of our
first chapter.

First Adams concealed his true motives and bided his time.

Then when an opportunity to do damage presented itwelf, he drew aside the
veil.3
2corwin, op. cit., 380.
3Adams depuis-un mois en France quand La Fayette etait parti, donnait
deja alors des motifs d'augurer que les antipathies et la passion antigallicanes, representeee jusqu'ici par Arthur Lee a notre cour d'une
fa~on dissimulee ou brouillonne, s'y montreraient desormais a nu et en
quelque sorte systematiquement, sous le couvert official. Doniol, ~·
~.,

IV, 409.
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Doniol maintains that Adams was a subtle intriguer and a good
actor; that he affected ignorance in order to disturb,4 that he sent
artful letters to entrap an unwa~ F~ench minister.5 But at other times
Doniol claims that he was possessed of the insolence of an Eastern
potentate.6

If Adams expressed attachment for the alliance, it was

probably because an obliging

minist~

had been beguiled into requesting

such an affirmation just when it suited the plan of John Adams.7 At
times, Doniol hints, that Adams was like a street urchin hurling stones
at the unsuspecting passer-by;8 at other times he leapt to attack like
one of Attila's Huns;9 but then, suddenly, he would reverse himself and
become a ver.y Uriah Heep with the pedantry of his captious arguments.lO
4correct en apparence avec le gouvernement du roi les premiers jours, il
n'avait pas moins parle de son mandat comme s'il agissait de traiter immediatement avec l'Angleterre, et'c'est ainsi qu'il affectait dele
comprendre en ecrivant au Congres en ce moment. Ibid., IV, 409.
5Le sens et lea intentions de sa lettre etaient viSibrement etudies. Elle
ne se bornait pas a dire, elle visait a faire entendre. Ibid., IV, 410.
6Sans balancer, d'ailleurs, il s'autorisait de ses conversatiOns a Boston
et de ses correspondances privees pour interpreter de cette mani~re le
mandat que lui avait confie le Congr~s. C'etait done bien l'esprit de
l'Est qu'il entendait apporter dans son ambassade. Ibid., IV, 410-11.
7Avec l'air de se defendre que les Anglais pussent s'ad~esser a lui, il
repondit le lendemain par de telles demonstrations d'attachement a
l'alliance, qu'il avait probablement souhaite d'etre amene a les faire.
Ibid., IV, 413.
~e pierre jet~e, Adams n'attendit guere pour en lancer une autre ••••
Ibid., IV, 420.
9dette lettre a peine lue, le 27 ~uillet, il sautait sur sa plume ••••
Ibid., IV, 421.
l~~is la lettre du 25 le fit eolater, si l'on peut dire cela de quelqu'un
se plaisant moins aux importements qu'A la pedanterie d'argumentations
captieuses. Ibid., IV, 421.
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At all times, le sectaire antigallicanll was ruled by anti-French hatred,l2
and even when he departed for Amsterdam, he transported his politique
antifranyaise.l3
Now there can be little doubt that Doniol, when he was commenting upon John Adams as Minister Plenipotentiary, surrendered his usual
prudent judgment as an historian to the enticements of the rhetorician
and loyal Frenchman.

He surely went beyond the facts when he impugned

Adams's patriotism by speaking of "le pr~tendu z~le de John Adams,"l4
and when he commented upon Vergennes's refusal to recognize Adams until
Gerard should return, by choosing a euphuistic adverb ·to express what was
really an utter lack of diplomatic courtesy: "M. de Vergennes, le 15,
repondai t obligeamment

a J.

Adams d I attendre le retour prochain de G~rard."l5

Such .a position in so noted an historian perhaps explains why Edward Corwin
said: "There are certain phases of the subject of French intervention in
the War of Independence with which Doniol does not pretend to deal, while
11~11. de Vergennes deolara sur l'heure la rupture, et i l le fit dans des
tennes qui ranettaient plus que s~chement a sa place le seotaire "antigallican. 11 Ibid., IV, 422.
12C'est apres ces-affirmations de la passion antifran9aise ou de la haine
d'humiliation ressentie par lui ou par ses amis contre lea peuples dont
ils n'avient pu et ne pouvaient encore faire autrement que d'appeler le
seoours, que J. Adams avait donne a M. de Vergennes avis de 1 'adhesion
du Massachusetts. Ibid., IV, 416.
On n'~tait pas, ~ cela, debarrasse de cet envoy~ tenace. Econduit
de ce cote, il chercha
revenir par d'autres •••• par oeux surtout qu'il
supposait devoir causer le plus de g~e au gouvernement du roi. Ibid.,
IV, 419.
----13Il avait transporte a Amsterdam sa politique antifran9ais •••• ~., IV,
425.
14Ibid., IV, 426.
15Ibid., IV, 411.
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on the phases with which he does deal he throws, for the most part,
only the light shed by the French correspondence,"l6 and why Samuel
Bemis said: "John Adams was a most resolute, unbending, and pertinacious American.

As a diplomatist he deserves better of his country

than many historians have been ready to admit."l7
But despite Doniol's prejudice, his charge is a serious one,
and it deserves careful consideration.
dominated by hatred of the French?

Was Adams's political life

It might he argued that

necessarily have failed as a diplomat at the French court.

Ad~ms

must

It could be

claimed that he necessarily must have regarded the French as a recent
enemy, since he supported the British against the French in the Seven
Years Tiar.

As a democrat, he must have disliked monarchist France.

a bigot, he must have hated Catholic France.
have feared the adroit French diplomacy.
~priori.

As

As a provincial, he must

And the arguments are not all

For in Adams's own Autobiography there are passages indicative

of anti-French sentiment amounting almost to hatred.

Our problem is: do

they prove the active influence of national and religious prejudice in
shaping the policy of John Adams?
Unfortunately it is indisputable that like many fellow New
16corwin, op. cit., 380.
17Bemis, Samuer-F., The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, D. AppletonCentury Compaey, New-York, 1935,17~
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Englanders Adams was infected early in life with an unreasoning Gallaphobia.

To Adams the French in Canada were "faithless and turbulent"

in civil life and priest-ridden in religion.

While the French in the

homeland were also dangerous in diplomac,y.
On March 21, 1756, the twenty-six year old Adams records a
Sunday night conversation on "the present situation of public affairs"
held at the house of Reverend

Antho~

Wibird.

Judge Cranch of

Braintree spoke of a letter of the Bishop of Quebec which had been used
as a malicious squib against the ''turbulent Gallicks."

This letter was

supposed to show the "hostile spirit of the French Catholics."

Adams

reports Cranch as commenting upon this letter particularly about the
French missionaries among the Indians.

Adams concludes very briefly,

"Some, he says, are very good men."l8
The tone of the last remark can be understood if we consider a
note in Adams's diary for the previous month:
The Church of Rome has made it an article
of faith that no man can be saved out of
their church, and all other religious
sects approach to this dreadful opinion
in proportion to their ignorance, and the
influence of ignorant or wicked priests.l9
On June 22, 1756, Adams comments upon the French and Indian Vfur
then raging:
The year opened with the projection of three
expeditions, to prevent the further, and
18Adams, Works, op. ~., II, 11.
19Ibid., II, 5.
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remove the present~ depradations and
encroachments of our turbulent French
neighbors.... The British nation has
been making very expensive and very
formidable preparations to secure its
territories against an invasion by the
French~ and to humble the insolent
tempers and aspiring projects of that
ambitious and f.aithless nation.20
On ,June

29~

1766~

he mentions that two of his

friends~

Goffe

and Paxton "told stories about the virtue of some neutrals (the French
AcadiansJ, their strict justice, their aversion to profaneness, etc."
Adams brushes aside the whole incident with the sneer, "All this from
Goffe and Paxton was meant in favor of Roman Catholic religion and civil
slavery, I doubt not."21
When we apply the following principle of Adams's political
creed to the question of his anti-French bigotry~22 we have added
evidence to believe in its existence.

Adams believed that "religion

has been so universally associated with government that it is impossible
to separate them."23
Catholic religion.

Now we know that Adams was prejudiced against the
Therefore, the argument would run, he is prejudiced

against the French.
20I bid., II, 23, 214.
21Ibid., II~ 196.
2~most vulnerable point of attack on the French alliance was the fact
that the ally was Catholic." Van Tyne, The Loyalists of the American
Revolution, Peter Smith~ New York City,-r929, 154.
----23Adams, Works, op. cit., VI, 478.
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On January 23, 1761 Adams borrowed from a certain Mr. Gridley
the second volume of the Corpus Juris Canonici, notis illustratum,
Gregorii XIII Jussu editum.

Before reading it he says that

11

it will

explain many things in ecclesiastical history, and open that system of
fraud, bigotry, nonsense, impudence, and superstition, on which the
papal usurpations are founded.n

After reading, his judgment is: "This

Institute is a curious monument of priestly ambition, avarice, and
subtlety.

'Tis a system of sacerdotal guile. "24
Although Adams prided himself that "narrow thoughts and

bigoted principles did not govern his actions,"25 he could inform James
Warren approvingly that in 1775 in his home town of Braintree that "we
have a few rascally Jacobites and Roman Catholics in this town, but
dare not show the.mselves."26

th~

Even after extended acquaintance with

Catholic France and Spain, the Church remains a "Platonic, Pythagoric,
Hindoo monster;"27 and he doubts whether the superstitious South
American Catholics are capable of forming a "confederation of free
governments."28

On May 19, 1821 he asks Thomas Jefferson in a letter:

"Can a free government possibly exist with the Roman Catholic religion?",29
and two years later he notes that it would be unprecedented that a
24Ibid.,
25Ibid.,
26Ibid.,
27Ibid.,
28Ibid.,
29Ibid.
_,

II, 116-7.
x. 46.
IX, 355.
X, 100.

X, 145.
X, 398.
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"Roman Catholic monarchy of five-and-twenty millions of people, at
once Cbe) converted into intelligent, free, and rational people."30
This last is a direct attack upon the possibility of a French Republic.
It is not necessary to mention his historical writings on
Coligny and the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre to prove prejudice.

Let

a few of his remarks upon the Society of Jesus suffice; in a letter to
Thomas Jefferson on November 4, 1816, he says:
My History of the Jesuits is in four volumes
in twelves, under the title of "Histoire
Generale de la Naissance et des progres de
la Compagnie de Jesus, et l'Analyse de ses
Constitutions et sea Privil~ges, printed at
Amsterdam in 1761. The work is annonymous,
because, as I suppose, the author was afraid,
as all the monarchs of Europe were, at that
time of Jesuitical assassination ••••
This society has been a greater calamity
to mankind than the French Revolution, or
Napoleon's despotism or ideology. It has
obstructed the progress of reformation and
the improvement of the human mind in society
much longer and more fatally.31
Three months before, Adams touched upon the restoration of the
Society of Jesus:
The restoration is indeed "a step
toward darkness," cruelty, perfidy,
despotism, death, and --- 1 I wish we
were out of danger of bigotry and
Jesuitism. May we be "a barrier against
the return of ignorance and barbarism."
What a colossus shall we be !32
30Ibid., X, 408-9.
3libid., X, 229 •.
32Ibid., III, 225~6.
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At times this record of ignorance, bigotry, and hatred is
lightened.

There was the time in the cathedral at

Leon--Ad~ms

often

visited the churches to study the architecture and to learn the language
from the sermons--when Adams was present for High Mass:
The bishop, as he turned the corners of the
church, spread out his hand to the people
who all prostrated themselves on their knees
as he passed. Our guide told us we must do
the same; but I contented myself with a bow.33
Then there is his rueful description of Versailles.

After deploring the

licentiousness of the French women, the dishonesty of court officials,
and the hypocrisy of Voltaire and Richelieu, he admits there was

11

a great

deal of humanity ••• of charity and tenderness for the poor •••• Yes ••• There
was a sort of morality."

And then quite begrudgingly he adds, "There

were maey other qualities that I could not distinguish from virtues."34
We have now presented the strongest positive evidence for
affirming that national and religious prejudices were the causes of
Adams's trouble with Vergennes.

Statements by Adams when he was presi-

dent, or which appear to be the result of his break with Vergennes are
clearly post factum.

In spite of this evidence and in spite of the very

unusual conduct which Adams pursued in his relations with Vergennes, it
is our conviction that we must search elsewhere for his true motives for
acting as he did.

We have seen that as an individual Adams was violently

opposed to the Catholic Church.
33Ibid., III, 248.
34Ibid., III, 171.

We have seen that, with the patriotic

r
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exuberance of the young British colonist. Adams was unfair to the
French during the Seven Years War.

More than that can not be charged

against Adams.
First of all. anti-Catholicism did not influence his
political opinions in opposing France.

Adams himself handled this

objection in a letter to M. Genet in which he answered four charges
of the Englishman. General Conway. against the stability of the FrancoAmerican alliance:
Religion is the fourth part of the barrier.
But let it be considered. first. that there
is not enough religion of any kind among
the great in England to make the Americans
very fond of them. Secondly. that what
religion there is in England. is as far from
being the religion of America as that of
France. The hierarchy of England is quite
as disagreeable to America as that of any
other country •••• The Americans had. and
have still. more reason to fear the introduction of a religion that is disagreeable
to them 6 at least as far as bishops and
hierarchy go. from a connection with England,
than with any other nation of Europe. The
alliance with France has no article respecting
religion. France neither claims nor desires
any authority or influence over America in
this respect; ••• So that upon the whole. the
alliance with France is in fact more natural,
as far as religion is concerned, than the
former connection with Great Britain or any
other connection that can be for.med.35
35Ibid •• VII, 173-4.
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But John Adams was not such a religious bigot as his cousin#
samuel.

For# a;fter disclaiming belief in the doctrine of "the total

and universal depravity of human nature,"36 he confessed that he was
not a strict Calvinist.

"I believe with Justin Martyr, that all good

men are Christians, and I believe there have been, and are, good men
in all nations sincere and conscientious."37
Indeed, John Adams was a firm believer in religious tolerance
as a political doctrine, but for him religious tolerance did not mean
an insipid indifferentism in private life as it does for so many today.
The man who said: "I am, therefore, of opinion that men ought (after
they have examined with unbiased judgments every sound system of
religion, and chosen one system on their own authority for themselves)
to avow their opinions and defend them with boldness,"38 and who was
proud that

11

it is notorious enough that I have been a church-going

animal for seventy•six years from the cradle"39 could also say, "My
opinions, indeed, on religious subjects ought not to be of any consequence to any but myself."40

John Adams could make the foregoing

statements because he could distinguish between an individual who in
debate boldly attacked the doctrines and practices of a church and a
statesman who accorded the same church tolerant treatment.
36Ibid.,
37Ibid.,
38Ibid.,
39!bid.,
40 Ibid.,

X, 254.
X, 390.
II, 8.
IX, 637.
X, 389.

r
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That John Adams as a statesman was not intolerant of the
catholic Church can be proved both from his statements and from his
public acts.

He longed for the day "when all men of all religions

consistent with morals and property, shall enjoy equal liberty,
property, or rather security of property, and an equal chance for
honors and power."41

He disliked the laws of Protestant Holland:

The proviso of conforming to the laws of
the count~, respecting the external show
of public worship, I wished to have
excluded; because I am an enemy to eve~
appearance of restraint in a matter so
delicate and sacred as the liberty of
conscience; but the laws here do not
permit the Roman Catholics to have steeples
to their churches, and these laws could not
be altered.42
When he drafted the Massachusetts Constitution, he was careful to
include an article guaranteeing freedom of religion.
He was even more opposed to the Episcopalian Church than he
was to the Catholic.

But there too, the objection was not so much to

the Anglican Church, "but to the authority of parliament on which it
must be founded."43

On December 29, 1765, he scornfully announced that

"the Church people are, many of them, favorers of the Stamp Act at
present."44

He referred to Anglican ministers as "slaves in principle,"

41Ibid., VIII, 232.
42Ibid., VII, 648.
4~b···
l.n., X, 185.
44Ibid., II, 168.
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or "poisonous talkers" or "instilling wrong principles in church and
5 ta te

into the people, striving to divide and disunite them."

And s orne

conversed "with some of the seekers of appointments from the Crown-some of the dozen, in the
to be beheaded."45

to~m

of Boston, who ought, as Hancock says,

Because the Church of England was a creature of

Parliament, with the king at its head, and its laws determined by
British statesmen, Adams learned to hate it in political life, more than
he did the Catholic Church.
With the mention of the fact that Adams more often complained
of the lack of religion in France rather than the presence of the
Catholic religion there, we come to our second consideration, viz., was
Adams a hater of the French people.

Perhaps we may be driven to conclude

that anti-Gallic hatred did not determine Adams's course as a statesman,
that just as he was capable of tolerating the religion of the French, so
he was capable of impartiality and fairness toward the French as
nationals.
As early as January 2, 1761, Adams, still a young and loyal
British subject, was writing:
If we consider every thing, the religion,
government, freedom, navy, merchandise,
army, manufactures, policy, arts, sciences,
45Ibid., II, 169.
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numbers of inhabitants, and their virtues 1
it seems to me that England falls short in
more and more important particulars than it
exceeds the kingdom of F'rance.46
In the course of the next twenty years there are many more passages in
his writings showing that Adams was capable of appreciating French
worth and that he was not dominated by anti-Gallic hatred.
Just a year before the incident which Doniol explains by
accusing Adams of anti-Gallicism, Adams was confiding to the privacy
of his diary that even though the pleasure of returning home from his
diplomatic mission in F'rance was very great, that "it is a mortification to leave F'rance."47

In a letter to his wife, Abigail, our

supposed Gallophobe explains himself more fully as he describes Paris:
The weather is every day pleasant; soft,
air; some foggy days, and about ten
of twelve days in January were cold and
icy. But we have had scarce three inches
o:i snow the whole winter. 'J'he climate is
·nore favorable to my constitution than ours.
':::'he cookery and manner of living here, which
you know lwericans were taught b~r their
former masters to dislike, is more agreeable
to me than you can imagine. The manners of
the people have an affectation in them that
is verJ amiable. There is such a choice of
elegant entertainlllent in the theatric way,
of good company, and excellent books, that
nothing would be wanting to me in this
count!"IJ but my family and peace to my country

~ild

46Ibid., II, 110.
4'(-rb.d
III, I 195 e
~·~
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to make me one of the happiest of men.
John Bull would growl and bellow at
this description. Let him bellow if
he will, for he is but a brute.48
Since Adams's command of the French language was much better, he could
now enjoy chance conversations with the common people of France.

That

he liked th5m is indicated by his description of the female shopkeepers,
who are "the most chatty in the world.

They are very complaisant, talk

a great deal, speak pretty good French, and are very entertaining.n49
John Adams studied and admired French authors.50

lie appre-

ciated and defended French court and religious ceremonials.51
student of French architecture, painting, and music.52
facts are difficult to reconcile

~~th

He was a

All of these

the charge that he was a mere

"sectaire antigallican."
However to consider the charge adequately, we must ask
whether

Ad~ns's

statecraft and political activity was determined by his

hatred of the French.

Again the evidence

see~s

In his letter to Genet in answer to
upon the French alliance,

Ad~a.s

to show that it was not.

G~neral

Con•vay's attack

advanced the argument that "when two

48Adams, Charles Francis, Familiar Letters of John Adams and His '~iife
Abigail Adams, During the Revolution, Hur~and Houghton, 1Iew York City,
1876, 358.
49Adams, Aorks, op. cit., III, 196.
50Ibid., III, 222:"
51Ibid., III, 125.
52Ibid., III, 118, 158.
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nations have the same interests in general, they are natural allies."
He affirmed that between America and France "nature has raised no
other barrier than the ocean," and concluded that a common enemy and
an essential community of interest had brought it about that "America
became the natural friend of France, and she the natural friend of the
United States.u53
Another argument Which seems quite persuasive against a
charge of anti-Gallicism is founded upon Adams's perspicacity as a
statesman.

In 1775 John Adams was the outstanding leader in America

who urged the colonists to contract treaties with Fra.nce.54

He urged

these treaties, because he was well-informed of the needs of the
United States.

These needs were so great that Edward Corwin concluded

that "the great majority of students today would, I suppose, concede
that but for our alliance with France the War of Independence would
have ended without independence."55

It was truly folly for a shrewd

American statesman to be unalterably opposed to the French.
One other reason for doubting that Adams was a "sectaire
anti-gallican," may be found in his ability to evaluate French motives.
To many Americans of that day to bring in French aid was like the Trojans
53Ibid., ¥II, 174-5.
54Ibid., II, 487.
55'CC5l'W1n, op. cit., 1.
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dragging the wooden horse within their walls.

Squibs were published in

the Tory press which capitalized on their French antipathies:
Say Yankees don't you feel compunction
At your unnat'ral, rash conjunction?
Can love for you in him take root,
Who's Catholic, and absolute.56
The French alliance now came forth,
The Papists flocked in shoals, sir,
Friseurs, Marquis, Valets of Birth
And priests to save our souls, sir.57
Even Washington admitted that he "never built much upon a French war."58
But Adams in his mature life expressed none of this shallow anti-French
prejudice, rather he gave an acute analysis of French motives which
accords with that of our greatest modern authorities:
Some gentlemen doubted of the sentiments
of France, thought she would frown on us
as rebels, and be afraid to countenance
the example. I replied to these gentlemen, that I apprehended they had not
attended to the relative situation of
France and England; that it was the unquestionable interest of France that
the British continental colonies should
be independent. • •• But there was more
than pride and jealousy in the case.
56Royal Gazette, Mar. 17, 1779. Quoted from Davidson, P., Propaganda
and the American Revolution, University of North Carolina Press,
Durham, N. c., l941, 320.
57Rivington's Gazette, Oct. 7, 1778. Quoted by Van Tyne, Loyalists,
op. cit., 154.
5~Nashington, George, Writings, John c. Fitzpatrick, editor, u. s.
Govermnent Printing Of'tice, YV'ashington, 1936, IX, 22.
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Her rank~ her consideration in Europe,
and even her safety and independence
were at stake.59
Adams insists that the French action was not a mere act of revenge
against England; he does not indicate that he believed the French were
desirous of subjugating a part of the United States for their very own.
He is capable of appraising their true needs and intentions.60

Such

penetration is usually lacking in the prejudiced.
So far from being prejudiced against the French during his
years as a diplomat, Adams was thoroughly disgusted by anti-French
bigotry.

A certain "F" told Adams that half the gentlemen of Paris

were atheists and said he wished he "could find one honest man among
their merchants and tradesmen."

Adams retorted:

"Mr. F." says I~ "let me be so free
to request of you~ when you arrive
in America~ not to talk in this style.
It will do a great deal of harm.
These sentiments are not just; they
are contracted prejudices; and Mr. Lee
and Mr. Izard have hurt themselves and
the public too by indulging in a
similar language." F. 11 01 I am no
hypocrite." Thus this prater goes on. 61
Even after Adams's dispute with Vergennes which led him to
insist that Vergennes is the only member of the French court "who ever
59Adams~ Works, op. cit., II~ 504.
60Ne

are accepting tne-thesis of Corwin rather than that of Turner.

61Adams~ Works, op. cit.~ III, 198-9.
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manifested any resentment that came to rolf knowledge,"62 he wrote thus
to the head of the American state department.

Secreta~

Livingston:

Ingratitude is an odious vice. and ought
to be held in detestation by eve~ American
citizen.... We are under obligations of
gratitude [to the French) for making the
treaty with us at the time when they did,
for those sums of money which they have menerously given us, and for those even which
they have lent us, which I hope we shall
punctually pay, and be thankful still for
the loan, for the fleet and army they sent
to America, and for all the important services
the.y did ••••
The French are, besides, a good-natured and
humane nation, ver,y respectable in arts,
letters, arms, commerce, and, therefore,
motives of interest, honor. and convenience
join themselves to those of friendship and
gratitude, to induce us to wish for the
continuance of their friendship and alliance.63
From these facts, and because neither Franklin nor Vergennes
attributed Adams's conduct to his supposed anti-Gallicism. we are forced
to look elsewhere for an explanation of Adams's actions.

Doniol. it

seems. too easily permitted himself to argue from the existence of antiGallic feeling rampant in America to anti-Gallic prejudice as the
explanation of Adams's unusual conduct while in France.

Actually,

Adams appears to have been following a more subtle counsel than mere
prejudice.
62Ibid., I, 652.
63Ibid •• VIII. 94.

CHAPTER III
THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUAL PREJUDICE

The French historian and biographer, Bernard Fa,, has another
explanation of the incident which was chronicled in the first chapter.
Since he is an acknowledged authority in this period of histor,y, it is
with some misgiving that we take issue with his view, but we feel
compelled to do so in the interests of truth.
F&y admits that the patriotism of Adams can not be challenged,
and he makes no mention of anti-Gallic hatred.

Rather, his explanation

is founded on Adams's peculiar personality:
Mr. Adams had the instinct of self. He
conceived all his interests to be rights,
which made him profoundly moral and ver,y
powerful in discussion. Moreover, he was
a la~er and imposed a logical and
rigorous form on his egoism so that he
could believe in his own justice. Whenever he perceived the existence of some
one else he was judicious and excellent,
but ordinarily he was occupied only with
himself.l
With rather a generous measure of sarcasm,

Fa~

develops his thesis:

At first Adams had highly respected
Mr. Franklin, whose conversation was so
interesting, and who was a reflection of
Mr. Adams's brilliancy in Congress. As
such he was ver,y satisfactor,y. But when
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Mr. Adams arrived in Paris in the spring
of 1778 and had to be a mere reflection
of Doctor Franklin, who ruled over the
ministers, ladies, and the learned men,
he immediately thought the situation was
unhealthy. Nevertheless, his instinct
of "justice" made him wait for some provoking incident before he should give
vent to his anger.2
F~y

next explains how Adams united with Arthur Lee against Franklin and

how "the two of them made life difficult for Franklin."3
Now Vergennes was peculiarly friendly to Franklin, "as he

•
(Franklitij had been named minister on account of Vergennes' solicitation,"
and "in 1781, Franklin held onto his post only because he had some
personal friends Who were clever at intrigues, and because he enjoyed the
favor of the King of France. "4

Indeed, if he could Vergennes always dealt

with Franklin alone of all the American commissioners.

So in 1780, "when

the hopes of peace had faded, the jealous New Englander gave some
lessons in politics and morals to Vergennes to divert himself."5
This explanation of Bernard Fag places jealousy of Franklin as
the motive for Adams's attack upon Vergennes.

Such a stand is supported

by the fact that Adams's long letter of comment upon the Vergennes
episode is mostly an attack not upon Vergennes, but upon Franklin.
Adams finds Franklin guilty of "gross inconsistency in demanding or
requesting the Count to recall his orders."
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 442.
4Ibid., 443.
Sfbid., 443-4.

He is surprised that Franklin
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was ''so ignorant as not to see the iniquity of the French claim of
silver dollar for paper dollar."
"Dr. Franklin a hypocrite."

He wonders whether the King thought

Then he noted that there was a paragraph

in Franklin 1 s letter "which is a downright falsehood."

The sentence

in Adams's letter Which sums up his understanding of Franklin's motives
says: "I have always seen that it was Dr. :F'ranklin' s heart 1 s desire to
avail himself of these means and this opportunity to strike

r~Ir.

Adams

out of existence as a public minister, and get himself into his place."6
Since this attack upon Franklin was written for the Boston
Patriot thirty one years after the incident of Which it speaks, and
twenty-one years after the death of Franklin, it is a good indication of
the persistence of Adams's feelings against Franklin.

There is also

abundant evidence to indicate that Adams had developed his dislike of
Franklin before the incident of our first chapter.

Before considering

this evidence, some indication should be given of the ebullient
character of Adams's dislikes When they rose from affronted vanity.
When Adams was but 'bwenty-three, he records in his diary that
he was insulted in company by Robert Treat Paine, who was "conceited,
and pretends to more knowledge and genius than he has."

The conversation

must have concerned Adams's studies in law, for he writes:
He asked me what Dutch commentator I meant?
I said 1 Vinnius. "Vinnius !" says he, (with
6
Adams, Works, ~· ~., I, 649-64.
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a flush of real envy, but pretended contempt,)
"you cannot understand one page of Vinnius."
He must know that human nature is disgusted
with such incomplaisant behaviour; besides,
he has no right to say that I do not understand every word in Vinnius or even in •••
for he knows nothing of me. For the future
let me act the part of the critical SP,Y upon
him; not that of an open, unsuspicious friend.7
He continues his account of Bob Paine's high-handed dealings with him
by indignantly recalling that he had been told that once Paine in his
absence called him ''a numbskull and a blunderbuss before all the
superior judges."8

Just at the end of this none too impassive account,

Adams 1 s better nature again asserts i t-.·elf and he concludes more justly
that, although Paine "is an impudent, ill bred, conceited fellow", he
"has virtue, and piety, except his fretful, peevish, childish complaints
against the disposition of things.

This character is drawn with resent-

ment of his ungenerous treatment of me, and allowances must therefore be
made." 9
Unfortunately, Adams made no request that allowances be made,
when he penni tted himself to be "led on naturally by the Chevalier and

xE.

Marbois 11 in a discussion of Franklin, as he was returning to America

after his first diplomatic mission in France in 1778.

Adams had just

hinted that Franklin did not go to church because he had no religion.
Marbois's next remarks unleashed Adams's bias against Franklin:
"No," said ~.1. Marbois; "Mr. Franklin adores
only great Nature, which has interested a

7.1.Tb"d
1 • , I I, 50.
II, 51 •
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great many people of both sexes in his favor."
"Yes," said I, laughing, "all the atheists,
deists, and libertines, as well as the
philosophers and ladies, are in his train ,-another Voltaire, and thence--"Yes," said M.
:r;Iarbois, "he is celebrated as the great
philosopher and the great legislator of
America." "He is," said I, "a great philosopher,
but as a legislator of America he has done very
little. It is universally believed in France,
England, and all Europe, that his electric wand
has accomplished. all this revolution. But
nothing is more groundless. He has done very
little. It is believed that he made all the
American constitutions and their confederation;
but he made neither. He did not even make the
constitution of Pennsylvania, bad as it is •••• nlO
When lv1arbois spoke of the wit and iroey of Franklin, Adams observed that
"these were not the faculties of statesmen. 11

Later, Ada"!ls makes

mention in a sneering way of "Mr. F's natural son, and natural son of a
natural son."

He concludes the interview by remarking that he thought

it his "duty" in 11the interests" of his country to "do justice to his
(Franklin's) merits."

"It would be worse than folly to conceal my

opinion of his great faults,"ll even from the influential French ambassadors.
When Adams had returned to Braintree, he wrote Thomas McKean
his opinions of Franklin:
He is not a sufficient statesman for all
the business he is in. He knows too little
lOibid., III, 220.
l!Ibid., III, 221.
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of American affairs, of the politics of
Europe, and takes too little pains to
inform himself of either.... He is too
old, too infirm, too indolent and dissipated, to be sufficient for the discharge
of all the important duties of ambassador,
board of war, board of treasury, co~~isary
of prisoners, etc., etc., etc.l2
In judging whether Adams's evident dislike of Franklin determined his diplomatic dealings in France in 1780, it is necessary first
of all to explain the diplomatic situation in France and the basic
diversity of policy pursued by Franklin and Adams.

We shall leave an

extended treatment of the second of these considerations for our next
chapter, since it is our opinion that in motives of state we have the
ultimate explanation of why Adams antagonized Vergennes.
The diplomatic situation and American diplomatic methods were
quite unusual in 1780.
culties.

American diplomats labored under enormous diffi-

They were bound by instructions which manifestly could not

provide for every eventuality.

If there appeared to be a need of modi-

fication on their instructions, the great distance to America made it
impossible for them to refer to their government for advice and for new
instructions.

Hence they were forced to assume an attitude of uncompro-

mising firmness. 13

Indeed, every diplomat was accorded remarkable

freedom of action.
In addition, account must be taken of the

~overnment

of the

12Ibid., IX, 486.
13Chinard, Gilbert, Honest John Adams, Little Brown and Compa.ny, Boston,
1933, 141.
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United States which they were representing.

As Adams put it, Congress

was neither a legislative nor a representative assembly but rather an
assembly of diplomats, i.e., of plenipotentiaries.l4

Congress was

representing states who were very jealous of their sovereignty.

The

difficulty, then, of representing Congress, carrying on important and,
therefore, sometimes secret negotiations was almost insuperable.
Finally, with a newly organized department of state, but
without a trained diplomatic corps, and with no established diplomatic
relations with the important countries of the world, the ambassadors of
the former colonies of England were beset by enormous difficulties.
Franklin's solution of those difficulties is expressed in a letter to
Arthur Lee, March 21, 1777: "I have not yet changed the opinion I gave
in Congress that a virgin state should preserve its virgin character and
not go about suitoring for alliances, but wait in decent dignity for the
best.

I was overruled; perhaps for the best."l5
The view which prevailed was that of John Adams.

He had held

that ministers should be sent to all of the great capitals of Europe,
even though they had no assurance of being officially received.

He termed

this type of representation umili tia diplomacy," and after Franklin 1 s
criticism of his dealings with Vergennes, he defended his diplomatic
l4Doniol, op. cit., IV, 348, n.
15Franklin:-Benjamin, Works, Jared Sparks editor, Hilliard, Gray and
Company, Boston, 1840, VIII, 439.
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conduct to the president of Congress by contrasting his course with that
of "vei:erans of diplomatics."
which

"sometL~es

from the rules."

lie said that he approved of "the

militia~"

gain victories over regular troops even by departing
He concluded with a sentence which placed his

diplomatic procedure in sharp contrast with that of Franklin: "I have
long since learned that a man may give offense to a court to which he
is sent and yet succeed. 1116

On the other hand, as Claude Van Tyne says,

Franklin's whole diplomatic policy in France was simple--"It is my
intention, while I stay here, to procure what advantage I can for our
country by endeavoring to please the court."l7
There was bound to be disagreement between these two men.
However Bernard Fa!f's thesis goes beyond mere difference of policy and
maintains that jealousy of Franklin determined Adams's course of action
in 1780.

In spite of the considerable evidence showing Adams's dislike

of Franklin, and in spite of the fact that Adams's unjust suspicions of
Franklin undoubtedly made both Adams and Franklin less effective in
France, it does not seem that dislike of Franklin determined Adams
actions.

Rather, the dislike itself sprang in part from another and

more important source: essential divergence of policy.
Gilbert Chinard explicitly contradicts the thesis of Fa!} a 11 !he
l~Vharton, op. cit., V, 196-7.
17van Tyne,-claude, The American Revolution, Harper and Brothers Publishers,
New York City, 190s;-220.
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so-called hostility of Adams towards the French Court was not grounded
on petty jealousy of the 'veneration' in which Franklin was held, nor
on any personal resentment. ttlS

Carl Van Dorenl9 implicitly rejects

Fag's thesis by commenting at length on the relations between Adams and
Franklin without ever hinting at Fag's explanation.
Fag's thesis must be rejected because it contradicts the
opinions of reputable authorities; moreover it

appea~s

to be forced,

since it does not explain why an honest and shrewd statesman like Adams
should choose Vergennes as the man to attack; and finally, because of
the truly amazing inferences by which Fag arrived at his conclusions.
!<'ay attacks Adams in this way: "Franklin and Lee did not get
along together, and Adams judged Franklin to be in the wrong, right
away. 11 20

Now such a conclusion so unfavorable to Adams is not at all

evident.

We know What disgraceful contention born of factions had split

the American commissioners before the arrival of Adams.

Despite this

situation, we have no reason for believing that Adams took sides right
away with anyone:
It is with much grief and concern that I
have learned, from my first landing in
France, the disputes between the Americans
in this kingdom; the animosities between
Mr. Deane and Mr. Lee; between Dr. F'ranklin
and llr. Lee; between lv1r. Izard and Dr.
Franklin; between Dr. Bancroft and 1,fr. Lee;
between Mr. Cannichael and all. It is a rope
18chinard, op. cit., 121.
lSVan Doren:-op:-Qit.
20.B'ag, op. cit., 441.
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of sand. I am at present wholly untainted
with these prejudices, and will endeavor
to keep myself so. Parties and divisions
among the Americans here must have disagreeable1 if not pernicious, effects •••• I am :
sorr,y for these things, but it is no part
of my business to quarrel with anybody without cause; it is no part of my duty to differ
with one party or another, or to give
offense to anybody; but I must do my duty to
the public, let it give offense to whom it
will.21
Six months later, just before Adams left for America, he had
not yet taken a stand with any party and he sums up the situe.tion sadly-"There is no man here that I dare trust at present.

They are all too

much heated with passions and p~ejudices and party disputes."22

He does

not seem to have sided with Lee, for he says, "However difficult his
temper might be, in my opinion he was an honest man, and had the utmost
fidelity towards the United States, (but) he has confidence in nobody;
he believes all men selfish, and no man honest or sincere.n23

If Adams

attacked Franklin by saying that "his age and real character render it
impossible to search every thing to the bottom," of Lee he added: "Lee,
with his privy council, is evermore contriving: the results of their
contrivance render many measures more difficult."24
21
Adams,
22Ibid.,
23Ibid.,
24Ibid.,

Works, ~· cit., III, 138.
III, 188-9.
III, 187-8.
III, 189.
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Confronted by these facts, it seems that Van Doren's conclusion
is a much better su.TDm.ary than Fa9" 's: "Franklin at once and Arthur Lee a
little later told

Ada~s

of the bad blood in the embassy.

He seems to

have tried to avoid being a partisan of either side, and to devote
himself to straightening out the confused accounts and disorderly methods
of official business into which the envoys had fallen."25
As his next point Fa!} says: "Franklin did not pay for his
pleasant house'but did pay for his suitable retinue of servants.
was all wrong.

This

He should have paid for the house, since it was

humiliating for an ambassador to be lodged for nothing, but he did not
need a coach or so many servants, as the United States was a poor
country."26
This irony seems to miss its mark.

\lh.en Adams arrived in

France, the financial condition of the commission was appalling.

Each

corrunissioner had a different commercial agent, who drew upon whatever
sums were at hand for his personal expenses.

No accounts were kept,

no duplicate bills were made, no distinctions were rnade between personal
and public expenses.

For example, Franklin had established himself in

the Hotel Valentinois, without inquiring about the rent.

Since this was

to be the headquarters of the commissioners, Adams, who had charge of
accounts, wrote Le Ray de Chaumont to discover "what rent we ought to pay
25van Doren, op. cit., 599.
26FaY', op. cit., 441.
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you for this house and furniture, both for the time past and to come." 27
As Chinard remarks, "Adams was pleasantly surprised and somewhat
suspicious when the French financier answeredn 2 8 that he had "consecrated" his house to Franklin and that to have his house "inunortalized
by receiving into it Dr. Franklin and his associates" was reward enough.29

Adams merely thought that it was improper for the American commissioners
to accept this house as a gift from Chaumont who had bid for a number of
American contracts.
Next

Fa~

presents quite an amusing picture of the two men:

Franklin worked night and day, sometimes sleeping
only two or three hours, and was more interested
in the output of his work than in sticking to
formalities. Adams started to put Franklin's
portfolios into such order that the Patriarch
could no longer find anything he wanted.30
Little need be said of this summation of the two men except that it is
monstrously unjust.

Adams did a great service to the American

commissioners by putting their accounts in order, and with the exception
of

Fa~,

most scholars

a~~it

that Adams's organizing ability nicely

complemented the bonhomie of the Doctor.

A glance at Franklin's social

calendar makes the expression "worked night and day" appear pa.rticula.rly
ill-chosen.
One final charge FaY. makes against Adams which should be
mentioned in passing.

Fa~

mentions the fact that Adams wrote to his

27Adams, 'ilorks, op. cit., VII, 31.
28Chinard, op. cit.,-rls.
29•Adams, .,.liorks,
-op.
- cit., VII, 32, 33.
30Fa , op. cit. 442.
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cousin Sam and urged that the plurality of commissioners in F'rance be
reduced to one.

Fa"!J adds, ''His own choice was so evident that he did not

take the trouble to state it.n31
Adams.
sioner.

Here too there is injustice done to

Arthur Lee had urged his own a_ppointment as the single com.;nisAd~ns

did not.

Indeed when Adams made the reconmendation that

there''be a single commissioner appointed, 11 he expected either to be
recalleu or to "be sent to some other capital."32

".'JhenAdams heard of the

appointment of Franklin as single conunissioner, he wrote in his diary:
But this day Dr. Winship arrived here
from Brest, and soon afterwards the
aide-de-camp du Marquis de Lafayette,
with despatches from Congress, by which
it appears that Dr. Franklin is sole
plenipotentiary, and of consequence that
I am displaced: The greatest relief to
my mind that I have ever found since the
appearance of the address. Now business
can be done by Dr. Franklin alone; before
it seemed as if nothing could be done.33
In conclusion, it seems necessary to censure Adams for his
undiplomatic and uncharitable remarks against Franklin to the French
ambassadors, and to condemn his injustice in commenting so unfairly
upon Franklin's actions during the Vergennes episode.

But just as

this last item does not show virulent hatred, since the publication of
a number of Franklin's letters moved Adams, who was then a vain old man,
31Fa~, op. cit., 442.
32Chinard, ~P· cit., 124.

33Adams, IIT; 19!;
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to defend himself, so it seems that the thesis of Bernard Fag must be
rejected.

Imprudent speech and ebullient vanity scarcely prove jealousy

of Franklin was the ultimate reason which determined John Adams to
antagonize Vergennes.

CHAPl'ER IV
THE

IUFLUEi~CE

OF MOTIVES OF STATE

For a correct understanding of the foreign policy of John
Adams in 1780, it has seemed

necessa~

to outlaw the twin vices of

national and individual prejudice as determinants of his actions.

Uow,

even if it were admitted that the hasty temperament and diplomatic
inexperience which characterized Adams were augmented by another somewhat irrational element, namely: his dread of French sagacity in negotiation, it seems that the ultimate explanation of his seeming hostility
to Vergennes would not yet have been advanced.

Fear of the "superior

dexterity of the French plenipotentiariesttl would explain why Adams was
never wholly at ease at the French court, but it does not explain the
motive force behind Adams's course of action.
The ultimate reason which moved Adams to act as he did seems
to have been that he accepted certain principles to be found in
Washington's Farewell Address, long before they were so enunciated:
The great rule of conduct for us, in
regard to foreign nations, is, in
extending our commercial relations, to
have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have
already formed engagements, let them be
fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here
let us stop.
Europe has a set of primary interests,
lAdams, "1"/orks, ~· 2.!,!•, II, 110.
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which to us have none, or a ver,y remote
relation. Hence she must be engaged in
frequent controversies, the causes of
which are essentially foreign to our
concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be
unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by
artificial ties, in the ordinar,y vicissitudes of her politics, of the ordina~J
combinations and collisions of her
friendships or enmities.2
There is abundant evidence to show that early in his career
as a statesman Adams wholeheartedly accepted the above view.
e~~ple,

For

speaking of the French alliance, Adams added these comments to

his Autobiography for the year 1775&
That our negotiations with France ought,
however, to be conducted with great
caution, and with all the foresight we
could possibly obtain; that we ought not
to enter into any alliance with her,
which should entangle us in any future
wars in Europe.... If we united with
either nation [France or England], in
any future war, we must become too subordinate and dependent on that nation, and
should be involved in all European wars,
as we had hitherto; that foreign powers
would find means to corrupt our people, to
influence our councils, and, in fine we
should be little better than puppets, danced
on the wires of the cabinets of Europe. ·ive
should be the sport of European intrigues
and politics.3
Now, When we recall that eefore 1776, the English colonists in
America had become involved in every war in which the mother country was

tA Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Bureau of

National Litera-ture, I"nc., New-rork City,--mrhe F'arewell Address, 11 1897,
I, 214.
3Adams, Works, op. cit., II, 505.
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engaged, whether or no they understood or cared about the issues
involved, Adams's words seem to be an acute and cogent statement of
fact.

However, because the above account labors under the drawback

of having been written many years after 1775, it may be argued that
perhaps Adams inserted inadvertently some
Autobiography.

~

post facto views into his

None the less, because of the constant reiteration of

this sentiment in his letters and diar.y, as we shall show in this
chapter, it is at least probable that he was giving an accurate account
from memory of his sentiments in 1775.
There is another probable argument for asserting that almost
from his cradle as an American statesman Adams held that those European
nations, who either openly or covertly attempted to influence the
councils of the United States, should be resisted stoutly.

It is the

argument proposed by Samuel Bemis, and it is a particularly brilliant
piece of historical inference.

Bemis first takes note of a paragraph

which appeared in Tom Paine's Common Sense, which was published in
Philadelphia in January, 1776:
••• any submi·ssion to, or dependence on
Great Britain, tends directly to involve
this Continent in European wars and
quarrels.... As Europe is our market for
trade, we ought to form no political
connection with any part of it. 'Tis the
true interest of America, to steer clear
of European contentions, which she never
can do,while by her dependence on Britain,
she is made the makeweight in the scale of
British politics.4
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Now, Adams in his old age wrote in his Autobiography that Paine's
treatment of independence "was clearly written," but contained only
"a tolerable summary of the arguments which I had been repeating again
and again in Congress for nine months."5

Bemis ad_mits that a thorough

search of E. C. Burnett's Letters of Members

of~

Continental Congress

revealed no record of any statement of Adams which explicitly enunciated
the principle in question before January 1776, but he concludes that it
is "quite possible and likely that Adams independently developed a
reasoning against involvement in European wars and politics, even before
Paine."6
There is, however, an abundance of direct and certain evidence
that Adams accepted the principle of no "entangling alliances" by March
1776.

Just at this time Adams was intensely aware that once the

colonies were independent they would be deprived of trade with England,
and that without trade the colonies' hopes of independence would never
be realized.

Consequently, to supply that lack, Adams looked to France,

the traditional enemy of England, and a country which possessed valuable
commercial holdings in the West Indies.

From the first, however, he

conceived his problem to be not how to attract French aid, but how to
avoid being swayed by French influence while America was receiving her
assistance.

On March 1, 1776, he stated his position quite clearly

5Adams, Works, op. cit., II, 508-9.
6Bemis, op. cit-:-;- l~fn.
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during a debate in the Constitutional Convention:
Is any assistance attainable from France?
V\'hat connection may we safely form with
her? 1. No political connection. Submit
to none of her authority; receive no
governors or officers from her. 2. No
military connection. Receive no troops
from her. 3. Only a commercial connection; that is, make a treaty to receive
her ships into our ports; let her engage
to receive our ships into her ports;
furnish us with arms, cannon, saltpetre,
powder, duck, steel.7
Adams at no time tended to minimize the need of a commercial
treaty with France; indeed, although he was a great lov·er of independence and one of the outstanding jurists of America, he said that it
was his conviction "that these three measures, independence, confederation, and negotiations with foreign powers, particularly France,
ought to go hand in hand, and be adopted together."B

Nevertheless, when

Patrick Henry on May 20, 1776 wrote in panic to Adams that it was necessary to make alluring offers to France "to anticipate the enemy at the
French court," because otherwise the "consequence is dreadful,"g Adams
viewed the situation more calmly.

He moved with caution, always with the

hope that a commercial treaty would be sufficient to guarantee French aid.
It was his constant policy to avoid any political union with France.
Vfuen he was appointed to prepare a form of treaty to be
7Ada.ms, 'N"orks, op. ~.,II, 488-9.
8Ibid., II, 503:9Ibid., IV, 201.
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proposed to foreign powers, Adams proved again that he must be classed
with Richard Henry Lee, who reiterated in his letters that "American
independence must be her own achievement,nlO and Arthur Lee who
constantly urged upon Samuel Adams that "American liberty must be of
American fabric."ll

The drafting committee consisted of Dickinson,

Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, Robert Morris, and John Adams.

In

September of 1776, it submitted its report in the shape of an elaborate
draft of a treaty, which John Foster said was "mainly the work of John
Adams."l2

In his Autobiography, Adams summarized his work:
The committee appointed me ••• to draw up a
plan and report •••• Vfuen it came before
Congress, it occupied the attention of
that body for several days. Nfany motions
were made to insert in it articles of
entangling alliance, of exclusive privileges, and of warranties of possessions ••••
It was chiefly left to me to defend my
report, though I had some able assistance,
and we did defend it with so much success
that the treaty passed without one particle
of alliance, exclusive privilege, or
warranty.l3
Even in his private letters we find Adams insisting upon the

same principle.

In a letter to James Warren on April 27, 1777, he

lOJiendrick, Burton J., The Lees of Virginia, Little, Brown, and Company,
Boston, 1935, 232.
llibid.
12Foster, John, A Century of American Diplomacy, Houghton, Mifflin and
Company, Boston, 1901, 197
13Adams, Works, op. cit., II, 516-7.
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wrote:
I do not love to be entangled in the
quarrels of Europe; I do not wish to
be under obligations to any of them,
and I am very unwilling they should rob
us of the glory of vindicating our own
liberties.
It is a cowardly spirit in our
countrymen, which makes them pant with
so much longing expectation after a French
war. I have very often been ashamed to
hear so many whigs groaning and sighing
with despondency, and whining out their
fears that we must be subdued, unless
France should step in. Are we to be
beholden to France for our liberties?l4
Although Congress's instructions did not permit Franklin and
Deane, the American commissioners at Paris, to offer France an alliance,
when they heard of the preparation of Burgoyne's expedition, they
resolved to disregard this limitation.

On February 2, 1778, they

promised that if France became involved in a war with England as a
result of her treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, the
latter would not make a separate peace.

Their action was sanctioned,

indeed joyfully approved, by Congress.
At this very time John Adams was journeying to France to
become America's third commissioner to that country.

When he was

informed of the treaty of alliance, he recognized America's need of an
ally at this time and accepted the news with equanimity.
14Ibid., IX, 462.

After he
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arrived in Paris and had studied the militar,v alliance at first hand,
he wrote, "The longer I live in Europe, and the more I consider our
affairs, the more important our alliance with France appears to me.
It is a rock upon which we may safely build."l5
However, Adams's acceptance of the alliance as a temporary
military expedient did not mean that he had abandoned his conviction
of the folly of entangling alliances.

Indeed his belief that he

should do all in his power to prevent permanent attachment of the
United States to France or to any other European country still persisted.
His attitude at this time is substantially that of Washington who said:
I am heartily disposed to entertain the
most favorable sentiments of our new ally,
and to cherish them in others to a
reasonable degree. But it is a maxim
founded on the universal experience of
mankind that no nation is to be trusted
farther than it is bound by its interest,
and no prudent statesman or politicians
will venture to depart from it.l6
Adams's cautious attitude toward the French alliance is both
understandable and to a considerable extent justifiable.

He was the

representative of people who were exposed to Tor,v propaganda which told
them: "Nothing therefore seems clearer, in human affairs, than, that the
revolted colonies, unaided by Great Britain, can never shake off the
15wharton, op. cit., II, 676.
16washingto'ii; ~'irrtings, ,££• ~·, XIII, 256.
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yoke of France, and that dependence on that kingdom must ruin America."l7
The New Englanders somehow always had misgivings when the Patriot propaganda answered:
Let Britain's I~onarch aim at lawless pow'r,
And on our western world his vengeance show'r; •••
1Vhile you great Louis, with God-like mind,
Persist in your resolve to save mankind.l8
Adams knew that this war was to be long and costly for the French.

He

felt that France intended to exploit any possible gains she was able to
make from the war.

He feared that some of the commercial, territorial,

or diplomatic gains of France might be at the expense of the former
colonies of England.
Despite the fact that there is no evidence to show that France
had sinister intentions in regard to America in the war, Adams was not
the only judicious statesman who mistrusted Vergennes.

Besides several

American diplomats, informed statesmen of both Spain and England thought
that America would pay dearly for her alliance with France.

Florida

Blanca characterized Vergennes's notion that a "durable peace" would
follow upon the abasement of England as "quixotic." 19

'While, on the one

hand British statesmen feared the outcome of the alliance for themselves;
on the other, they revealed their suspicion of French motives toward
17Royal Gazette, Dec. 5, 1778. Quoted by Davidson, op. cit., 320, fn.
18Pa. Packet, Sept. 4, 1778. Quoted by Davidson, op:-cit., 377.
19corwin, op. ~·· 106.
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America.

"The laws of self-preservation," they said, must direct

Britain.

"If the British colonies are to become an accession to France,"

then Britain must carry on such a campaign that "that accession Lbe] of
as little avail as possible to her enemy."20
It comes as no surprise, then, to find Adams, soon after his
arrival in Europe, urging America not to count too much upon French aid.
In a letter to Lovell on July 26, 1778, he writes:
You may depend upon it, although your
agents in Europe were to plead with the
tongues of men and angels, although they
had the talents and the experience of
Mazarin or the integrity of d'Asset,
your army in America will have more
success than they.21
Throughout his diary and letters we find the patriotic Adams placing
his confidence in the power of American arms.
being "beholden to France."

He hated the thought of

The violence of his feeling upon this

point stirred him on one occasion at least to an exaggerated outburst
of passion.

He tells us on the twenty-ninth of April, 1778, Arthur Lee,

Vergennes and he met the

W~rshall

Maillebois:

Mutual bows were exchanged, as we passed,
and Mr. Lee said to the Comte de Vergennes,
"That is a great general, sir." "Ah !n said

~he Annual Register, ~~View of the History, Politics, and Literature,
For the Year 1778, J. Dodsley, Pall Mall, London, 1779, ~.
21Wharton, op. cit., II, 664-5.
2
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the Comte de Vergennes~ ''I wish he had
the command with you 1" This escape was,
in my mind~ a confirmation strong of the
design at court~ of getting the whole
command of America into their own hands ••••
·My feelings, on this occasion~ were kept
to myself~ but my reflection was~ "I will
be buried in the ocean~ or in aD¥ other
manner sacrificed, before I will voluntarily
put on the chains of France, when I am
strugglin~ to throw off those of Great
Britain."G2
During 1779, Adams made a journey to the United

States~

and

returned not as a mere commissioner to France, but as minister plenipotentiary for the peace.

As we have seen the New Englanders were

careful to have Adams appointed to this

post~

since they had been

unable to have the Newfoundland fishery rights included as a sine qua
~

of the peace.

Adams was recognized as one who would never sacrifice

American rights in an effort to win the regard of France.
As an exponent of "militia diplomacy," Adams was inclined to
follow a policy which accorded him considerable freedom of action in
dealing with the French court.

As minister plenipotentiary for the peace,

he believed himself entitled to even greater freedom of action.
indeed~

And

when we consider the disgraceful state to which the Continental

Congress had fallen at this

time~

it is hard to condemn outright Adams's

attitude.
Further, from his numerous adverse criticisms of Franklin's
22Adams, Works, ~· cit.~ III~ 146-7.
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diplomatic policy, we may conclude with Morse that Adams looked upon
Franklin as "charmed and almost useless."23

With all of these facts

before us, it seems necessary to conclude that Adams regarded his
mission, in part at least, as affording him an opportunity of safeguarding America's independence of France.
Then came the incidents narrated in our first chapter.

Adams,

who had not visited Philadelphia on his return to the United States, had
no presentiment of thetremendous influence and information which Gerard
and La Luzerne
Congress.

enj~ed

as regards the councils of the Continental

It was a tremendous shock to a man who feared that France

covertly might be obtaining an overweening influence over his country,
to find Vergennes loathe to accept his account of his mission and
confident that Gerard would have more complete and accurate knowledge of
the mind of the Continental Congress.
This initial shock was followed by bewilderment at Vergennes's
reluctance to announce the purpose of his mission.

Why not tell the

British that he had come to contract commercial as well as peace
treaties with them?

One reason which would suggest itself to a man of

Adams's bent of mind would be that perhaps Vergennes intended to confine
American trade to France even after the expiration of the war for
23Morse, John T ... John Adams, .American Statesmen Series, VI, Houghton,
Mifflin and Company, Boston, 1899, 163.
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independence.

Finally, Adams's stand on the monetar,y policy of the

United States was an unforseen but natural result of his great desire
to see America govern her own affairs, free from the shackles of
European politics.
Even after Adams's break with Vergennes, there is abundant
evidence that Adams persevered in his conviction that America must keep
her skirts clear of European commitments.

He tells us that he want to

Holland for the very purpose of rendering "us less dependent on France. ''24
In his defense of this action Adams asked these rhetorical questions,
"Was this a crime?
America?

Was dependence upon France an object of ambition to

If dependence had been our object, we might have had enough

of it without solicitation, under England. 11 25
Vfuen Adams secured financial agreements with the Dutch, he
noted in his diar,y that he considered this victor,y one of the greatest
in his whole life.

In his state of exultation, he wrote to Dana, "When

I go to heaven, I shall look down over the battlements with pleasure
upon the Stripes and Stars wantoning in the wind at the Hague."26
Although the treaty with the Dutch was truly a great accomplishment-Foster says that "next to the French Alliance, the most important event
in the foreign relations of the Colonies was the negotiation of the
treaty with Holland," 27 --it is not too much to say that Adams was so proud
24Wharton, ~· cit., IV, 21-5.
25Adams, Wor£s, op. cit., I, 658.
26wharton, op. cit.,-v; 732.
27Foster, op. cit., 43.
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of it because it made the sovereignty of the United States more secure.
As we study Adams's words and deeds during the next few

years~

we see with how much force the principle of no "entangling alliances"

moved him.

In Holland he not only won a certain amount of financial

independence from France, but he would not even admit without qualifications that the United States was beholden to France for diplomatic
assistance in Holland.
aonsulted Due de la

When Livingston asked Adams whether he had

Vauguyon~

the French minister to Holland, to ask his

advice, Adams replied that de la Vauguyon "has been under infinite
obligations to the United States of America and her minister for the
success he had in this country."28

Although Adams acknowledged that

"our cause could not have succeeded here without the aid of France,"
he was quick to add: "The American cause and minister have done more to
introduce a familiarity between the French ambassador and some leading
men here than any other thing could; and if anybody denies

it~

it must

be owing to ignorance or ingratitude. 11 29
When Adams returned to Paris to take part in the peace negotiations

11

wi th an olive branch in his mouth, in his heart, and in his

head,"30 he had by no means forgotten his principles regarding American
independence from Europe.
secretary to Mr.

Oswald~

On November 11, 1782, he told
the English representative:

28wharton, op. cit., V, 689.
29Ibid.
-30Adams~ Works, III, 290.
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For my own part~ I thought America had
been long enough involved in the wars
of Europe. She had been a foot-ball
between contending nations from the
beginning~ and it was easy to foresee
that France and England both would
endeavor to involve us in their future
wars. I thought it our interest and
duty to avoid as much as possible~ and
to be completely independent, and have
nothing to do~ but in commerce with
either of them.31
Just a few days

later~

Adams did not hesitate to explain

himself to Oswald in person:
11

"You are afraid~ says Mr. Oswald today~
"of being made the tools of the powers
of Europe." "Indeed I am~" says I.
"What powers?" said he. "All of them,"
says I. "It is obvious that all the
powers of Europe will be continually
manoeuvring with us, to work us into
their real or imaginary balances of
power. They will all wish to make of us
a make-weight candle, when they are
weighing out their pounds.... But I
think it ought to be our rule not to
meddle; and that of all the powers of
Europe~ not to desire us, or, perhaps,
even to permit us, to interfere, if they
can help it.32
Study of Adams's staunch support of all American interests at
the peace table, of his collaborating with Jay rather than Franklin, of
the gathering of clouds of his distrust of Vergennes might well indicate
31Ibid., III, 308.
32Ibid., III, 316.
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additional evidence to show how strongly the motive of fear of
"entangling alliances" influenced Adams's actions as a diplomat.
prefer to conclude

~~th

Vve

the follovrlng passionate outbreak of his diary,

as he referred to the fact that the peace commissioners for the United
States were under orders to do nothing 1rlthout the advice and consent
of Vergennes:
I have been injured, and my country
has joined in the injury; it has basely
prostituted its own honor by sacrificing mine. But the sacrifice of me
was not so servile and intolerable as
putting us all under guardianship.
Congress surrendered their own
sovereignty into the hands of a ·French
minister. Blush l blush 1 ye guilty
records 1 blush and perish 1 It is glory
to have broken such infamous orders.
Infamous, I say, for so they vrlll be
to all posterity. How can such a stain
be washed out? Can we cast a veil over
it and forget it?33
It may well be admitted, with Morse, that Adams in his policy toward
Vergennes in 1780 resembled "a ship blundering through a fot; ban.1c,"3 4
but it can not be denied that the Goal of that ship vms to free
America of entangling alliances.
33.,-b
· -' , T... "'"I
3,..9
·" J.u.
.L 1
0 •
341:1orse, ~· ~., 180.

CHA?rER V

EVALU.ATIG'J CF AJ)J.;, .s 1 S ACTION

The decisive motive governing the foreign policy of John Adams
in his dealine;s with Ve:re;ennes in 1780 seems to have been not prejudice
but a determination to lessen America's dependence upon France.
Eovoever, to pass judgment upon the means which John Adams chose to
implement

that aim, and consequently to evaluate the incident which

resulted, it is necessa:rJ to consider both the personality of Adams and
the particular circumstances of his diplomatic dealings with Vergennes.
The contemporaries of John Adams have supplied historians with
abundant material for understanding his character.

One of the most

famous pen-pictures of Adams is that drawn by Benjamin Franklin.

In a

letter to Livingston, head of the American state department and rather
unfriendly toward Adams, Franklin wrote: "He (Adams] means well for his
count~J,

is always an honest man, often a wise one, but sometimes and

in some things absolutely out of his senses. 111
the above opinion of himself,

Ad~rrs

Although, upon reading

reacted by writing a long attack

upon Franklin and attempted to prove that wisdom guided all of his
actions,2 still it seems that Franklin's opinion is quite fair •

.flowever,

it was obviously influenced by the Vergennes incident.
lsmythe, Albert H., The Writing~ of Benjamin :F'ranklin, The Mac..millan
Company, New York City, 1905-7, IX, 62.
2Adams, Works, op. cit., I, 649-64.
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Franklin mentions A.daras 's honesty and patriotism; he implies
that Adams was endowed with moral integrity.

We can not fail to mention

that such a judgment is in sharp contrast with Adams's opinion of
Franklin.

In one of his wi t:'lering; sunnnaries of Franklin's character,

Adams remarked, "I can have no Dependence on His '!1ord.

I never know when

he speaks the Truth, and when not." 3
Thomas Jefferson, another outstanding leader of knerican
Revolutionai"'J history, adds his opinion of Adams: "He is vain, irritable,
and a. bad calculator of the force and probable effects of the motives
Which govern men.
him. " 4

This is all the ill which can possibly be said of

Here too, we have what should be an unprejudiced view of Ada..rns.

Although Jefferson was a frequent correspondent of Adams in later life,
he had been his political enemy.

Further, no discerning American during

the mature life of the out-spoken and tactless Adams should have hoped to
exchange mutual encomiums with him.
In his diary as a young man, Adams repeatedly scored himself
for yielding to vanity.5
intractability.

Undoubtedly, this fault in later life made for

Lindsay advisecl. William Lee that he should be successful

in working with Adams, were he carefUl, "not to hurry Adams too much; to
lead his ideas as softly as possible may be well, but if I am not
3warren-Ada..~s, Letters, II, 74.
4Jefferson, Memoirs (ed. 1829), 88.
5Adams, 1'iorks, op. cit., II, 61;72.
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mistaken in his character, he will not be driven, and has too high
opinion of himself to

take up hastily the opinions of others."6

Adams's colleague at Paris, the celebrated American diplomat
and jurist, John Jay, paid Adams's statesmanship a high compliment when
he wrote to urge his appointment as United States's ambassador to the
Court of Saint James:
It cannot, in my op~n1on, be long before
Congress will think it expedient to name
a minister to the court of London.
Perhaps my friends may wish to add my
name to the number of candidates. If
that should be the case, I request the
favor of you to declare in the most
explicit terms that I view the expectations of Mr. Adams on that head as
founded in equity and reason, and that
I will not, by any means, stand in his
wa.y. Were I in Congress I should vote
for him. He deserves well of his
country, and is very able to serve her.
It seems to me but fair that the
disagreeable conclusions, which may be
drawn from the abrupt repeal of his
former commission, should be obviated,
by its being restored to him.7
From the above quotations, we have grounds for passing judgment
upon Adams's personality and character, and these quotations may be
corroborated by the estimate of the various biographers of Adams.

Both

Foster and Morse insist that Adams's "temperament was not suited to
diplomacy,"

8

because lfhis heat, quickness, pugnacity, want of tact, and

6Letters of William Lee, collected and edited by Worthington Ford,
Brooklyn:-1891, II, 420.
7Wharton, op. cit., VI, 457.
8 Foster, 21:•
- - 96.
cit.,
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naive egotism could not have been compatible with permanent success in
this calling. n9

Gilbert Chinard and Charles Francis Adams agree with

Claude Van Tyne, who calls Adams "the stern Coriolanus of diplomacy,"lO
in insisting that Adams was
courage."ll

11

a man of fundamental honesty and real

Vernon Farrington stresses Adams's intellectual worth:

"In spite of his dogmatisms and inconsistencies he remains the most
notable political thinker--with the possible exception of John C.
Calhoun--among .American statesmen." 12

He concludes, "Though tactless

and blundering in dealing with trimming politicians ••• his many
sterling qualities merit a larger recognition than has been accorded
them by a grudging posterity. 11 13

In this last opinion Parrington is in

substantial agreement with the judgment of Samuel Bemis, quoted in our
second chapter.
The evaluation of Adams's character leads directly into a
discussion of his antagonism of Vergennes, which was the subject of our
first chapter.

We have seen that Adams was by nature a poor diplomat.

However inculpably, Adams would naturally give offense to almost any
court to which he was sent.

Perhaps it was this fault in a man otherwise

so great which led Chinard to say: "One cannot help regretting at times
9i'Jiorse, 2£.• ~., 166.
lOVan Tyne, The American Revolution, op. cit., 220.
llChinard, op:-cit., iii.
-- --12Parrington, Vernon, Main Currents in American Thought, Harcourt, Brace
and Compaey, New York City, 1927, I; 320.
13Ibid.
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that Adams did not stay at home among the people of his blood and tongue.
In Congress he would probably have played a much more useful role.

His

ardent patriotism might have spurred on a lagging and dispirited
assembly of men pinning all their hopes on foreign help."l4
But it is Adams in France whom we are to judge.

First of all.

looking to the debit side of the ledger which records his diplomatic
transactions in 1780. Adams seems to have lacked sufficient reasons for
his

11

teasing 11 15 of Vergennes.

However laudable was his ambition to

lessen the dependence of the United States upon France, some of the means
he used to effect his aim were quite purposeless and merely irritating.
Adams was needlessly careless of diplomatic form.

On several occasions

Vergennes had to suggest what common diplomatic courtesy should have
told Adams.l6

Such conduct was inexcusable.

Secondly, Adams's assumption of duties which were clearly
Franklin's was not only high-handed and officious, but it prejudiced
the success of the American embassy.

Moreover, it introduced needless

bad feeling among the ambassadors of the United States; it presented the
embassy with problems which undoubtedly should never have risen.

It is

difficult to imagine a more undiplomatic move than to flaunt the
14chinard, op. cit., 157.
1 5vergennes-rn a letter to La Luzerne summarized Adams's attitude by
saying that he had "une nouvelle preuve de la taquinerie de L·1. Adams."
Doniol. op. cit., IV, 424.
16Adams, 'v'iorks, op. cit., 124, 304.
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questionable monetar,y policy of the United States before the eyes of
Vergennes.

Furthermore, Adams's remarks to the subordinate officials of

the French foreign office may have been pregnant with truth, but if it
were absolutely necessar,y that they be uttered they should have been
addressed to other persons.

Finally, it is especially difficult to

find a sufficient reason for Ad~~s's letterl7 insisting that America
had often requested French aid in the past.

For this letter came just

when Vergennes was assisting most generously the American fleet, and it
could only prove that Vergennes was strangely misinformed or consciously
misrepresenting the facts.
a gracious retreat.

Ad~~s

left Vergennes no opportunity to make

Such an introduction of the tactics of the lawyer

or the debater into the diplomatic arena was imprudence of the highest
order.
On the credit side of the ledger, John Adams as a diplomat in
1780 has the good intention which guided him.

His assertion of American

needs and American sovereignty nicely complimented Franklin's policy,
which really would have been too pliant to the French will.

As Foster

says, "No man of his day had a clearer conception of the significance of
American independence or of the great future reserved for his country
and none of our foreign representatives was so earnest in impressing
17Wharton, op. cit., IV, 12-14.
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these ideas upon public men of Europe."l8
Secondly, even if Adams did not always choose the best means
to impress Vergennes or Franklin that in the past "America has been too
free in expressions of gratitude to France, for that she is more
obliged to us than we to her, and that we should show spirit in our
applications, ttl9 still, in other matters, he manifested considerable
tact and reserve.

Henri Doniol notes that Adams was careful to

realize that the two most delicate items in the future peace negotiations
with Ent;land would be the Mississippi and the Newfoundland fisheries. 20
But for over a year after his arrival in France, Adams said nothing
about these most important questions.

Vergennes, who had informed La

Luzerne in 1780 that he was prepared to frustrate Adams's efforts
regarding the fisheries,21 was never stirred into action by Adams.

But

when he met the British representatives in 1782, Adams gave such a
spirited defense of America's rights to the fisheries that he won them
for the United States:
Gentlemen, is there or can there be a
clearer right? In former treaties,-that of Utrecht and that of Paris,-France and England have claimed the
right, and used the word. When God
.Almighty made the banks of Uwwfoundland,

i~~oster, op. cit., 96.

vvfuarton,~.-ctt. I IV' 23.
20Doniol, op. cit., IV, 426.
21Ibid.
--
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at three hundred leagues distance from the
people of America~ and at six hundred leagues
distance from those of France and England,
did he not give as good a right to the former
as to the latter? If Heaven in the creation
gave a right, it is ours at least as much as
yours. If occupation, and use, and possession
give a right, we have it as clearly as you.
If war, and blood, and treasure give a right,
ours is as good as yours.22
Finally some mention should be made of the unusual difficulties
under which Adams labored.

~e

have already mentioned the difficulty of

being a shirt-sleeve diplomat for the American Congress, but it may be
well to permit Adams himself to particularize on the embarrassment of
this situation:
Ambassadors in Europe can send expresses
to their courts and give and receive intelligence in a few days with the utmost
certainty. In such cases there is no room
for mistake, misunderstanding, or surprise,
but in our case it is very different. We
are at an immense distance. Despatches are
liable to foul play and vessels are subject
to accidents. New scenes open, the time
presses, various nations are in suspense,
and necessity forces us to act. ·wnat can
we do?23
Besides this, Adams encountered the established policy of
American docility, little short of subaervience, to the French court.
But the one aggravating

circ~~stance

which excuses much of Adams's

unusual conduct was Vergennes's attitude toward him.
22Adams, ·~r
••ork s, op. c1. t ., III , 333-4.
23vvnarton, op. cit., VI, 52.
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to wait for Gerard. to keep the nature of his mission quiet. to accept
resignedly French concern for Spain even over the United States,
Vergennes was guilty of egregious psychological blundering.
misjudged Adams.

He badly

Indeed, it is most. probable that, even prescinding

from the individual concerned, wise diplomacy should condemn Vergennes
for acting in so cavalier a fashion.
Yie now come to our evaluation of the incident itself.
there is truth in Gilbert Chinard's

SQ~~ary

Although

of the importance of the

incident. we think that he overlooks certain important aspects which were
in a very immediate way effects of the incident.

Professor Chinard says:

So much importance has been attributed
to the difficulties arising between John
Adams and Vergennes in the S?ring of 1780,
that no passing notice of them would
suffice. In themselves, they were of
little consequence, but they revealed the
rift already existing in the alliance, a
radical difference between two schools of
diplomacy and two national psychologies.24
Now, if Professor Chinard means that we should be wrong in stressing the
individual prejudice of vanity of the principals of our drama to the
exclusion of the more important motives of state, we are in complete
agreement with him.

As we have admitted, we consider some of the actions

both of Vergennes and of John Adams to have been unworthy of them.
24Chinard. 2,£• cit., 140.
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we object to in Professor Chinard's summation is that he seems to

~~ly

that although the incident may have importance as an indicator of
conditions in the .American embassy, in itself it was of little consequence.
Edward Corwin and Samuel Bemis agree in explaining the change
in attitude of France toward Spain after 1780 as due in part at least to
the Vergennes-Adams controversy.

Corwin says:

But some time before this upshot of the
matter, Vergen..YJ.es had come to the conclusion that the standing of the alliance
with the American Congress, whose chosen
representative Adams evidently was, was
too delicate to be further jeopardized by
France's appearing in the thankless role
of champion for Spanish interests where
these conflicted with interests of the
United States. 25
Bemis's opinion is substantially the same:
Stimulated by the delegates from Virginia
and other southern States, Congress,
itself containing members who owned title
to western lands,became increasingly
conscious of the importance of the western
boundary. Spain was already belligerent and
there was not so much reason to compromise
as otherwise there might have been. French
advice on this point became irritating.
Vergennes, already aroused by the brusque
state~ents of John Adams, who had arrived in
Paris early in 1780 as peace plenipotentiary
and who suggested opening direct negotiations
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with Great Britain, thought it best to
adopt a neutral attitude as between the
conflicting interests of his two allies
in the valley of the l','lississippi.26
The second important effect which, in our opinion, the
Vergennes-Adams controversy had upon the diplomatic dealings of the
United States was that it was the background for the treaty with
Holland.

Our view is based upon the conviction that there is a causal

connection between the following successive sentences in Franklin's
report of the incident to Livingston:

M. de Vergennes, who appears much offended,
told me yesterday that he would enter
into no further discussions with Mr. Adat11s,
nor answer any more of his letters. He is
gone to Holland to try, as he told me,
whether something might not be done to
render us less dependent on France. He
says the ideas of this court and those of
the people of America are so totally different, that it is impossible for any
minister to please both.27
The opinion that chagrin over Vergennes's note severing
relations with him induced Adams to go to Amsterdam, even though he was
not commissioned to negotiate with the Dutch, is strengthened by Adams's
letter commenting upon the incident.

The dudgeon of Adams which resulted

from his clash with Vergennes seems to have been sufficient to fan into
flame his desire "to render us less dependent on France."
"Was France avaricious of a monopoly of our dependence?
26Bemis, op. cit., 103-4.
27,Wharton,
- op.
- -c~
. t., IV, 23.

Adams said:
The Count de
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Vergennes was, I believe; but I never suspected it of the King, or any
other of his ministers or any other Frenchman, but the

secretar~

of

foreign affairs and perhaps a. few of his confidential dependents." 28
Finally, we believe that the Vergennes-Adams controversy must
be classed as one of the remote causes of Adams's collaboration
John Jay in negotiating the Peace of Paris.

i~th

Because Adams had learned

to distrust Vergennes, he was quite ready to unite with Jay in refusing
to follow their instructions, which told them to keep Vergennes informed
about the progress of the negotiations and to accept his advice in all
important matters.
It seems evident, then, that the incident narrated in our
first chapter is historically important.

Even though both John Adams

and Vergennes permitted affronted vanity and temper to influence some
of their actions, still the ultimate effect of those actions went far
beyond

a~thing

which could have been foreseen at the time.

Accordingly, in summarizing this incident, which played its
part in lessening French partiality toward Spain in 1780, in effecting
the important Dutch treaty, and finally in excluding the French from
British-American negotiations in the Peace of Paris, we have found it
necessar,y to stress the great difficulties under which Adams labored.
28Ad

a.ms, ,.,>~ork s, op.

"t

~··

I , 658.
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He was far from his diplomatic headquarters; he had to deal with
Vergennes, who assumed an attitude of arrogance, and he had to combat
the too great pliancy of the American embassy.

Furthermore we have

admitted that his vanity, his brusquerie, his intolerance played an
important, though infelicitous, part in directing his course of action.
But, beyond all these influences we have stressed the existence of some
key-motive which would give a plausible explanation of why Adams
entangled himself, in so seemingly unnecessary a manner, in his quarrel
with Vergennes.
Only three explanations have appeared which seem plausible.
The first two rely upon the powerful impetus of prejudice; the third
stresses intellectual conviction.
The first explanation lays emphasis on the play of national
prejudice against the French as the ultimate reason for Adams's clash
with Vergennes.

This opinion is supported by some of Adams's anti-

French remarks, by the adequacy with which anti-Gallicism, if it
actually is the ultimate explanation of the incident, does seem to solve
the problem, and by the authority of the great French historian, Henri
Doniol.

We have found it necessary to reject this interpretation,

because all of Adams's anti-French remarks either were made during the
emotional stress of the Seven Year's War, when Adams was a British
subject, or can be much better explained by his fear of "entangling
alliances."

Furthermore, from his numerous eulogies of French worth and

from his obvious devotion to the French military alliance, it seems that

Doniol could not have had access to the Works of
his thesis.

Finally~

when he formulated

Adams~

we have been supported in our conclusion by the

fact that no modern historian accepts Doniol's solution.
The second explanation is that of Bernard Fa;V.

He urges that

Adams's conduct must have been motivated by individual prejudice: viz ••
jealousy of Benjamin Franklin.

Fa:V argues that Adams realized that

Franklin had acquired a great reputation in Europe; that Vergennes
preferred Franklin to any other American minister; and

finally~

that

the jealousy of Franklin induced Adams to adopt his haughty attitude
toward Vergennes.

We have rejected Fa;V's solution because it is

explicitly denied by both Chinard and Van Doren; it is based on inferences
which appear truly amazing; and finally. it seems quite forced as an
explanation.

It is truly inconceivable that Adams who was noted both

for his shrewdness and his moral integrity should choose to attack
Vergennes for no other reason than because he could not restrain his
jealousy of Franklin.
The explanation which we have adopted appears to be the only
one which explains all the facts satisfactorily.

It seems to us that

Adams acted as he did because he was convinced that French influence
over the councils of the United States must be lessened.

The facts which

have induced us to accept this solution are Adams's acceptance, even in
his youth as a statesman, of the principles later expressed in -vJashington' s
Farewell Address and the I.fonroe Doctrine; secondly, Adams's opposition to
a political alliance with the French in 1776, precisely because he

~s
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afraid that dependence upon France would be its outcome; and finally,
the truly amazing number of tunes Adams expresses this principle of no
"entangling alliances" during the years 1778 and 1783.
Our final recapitulation is that Adams was appointed by New
England representatives to the Continental Congress because they knew
that he would never sacrifice American rights to please any foreign
country; that he arrived in France only to contact a French minister
who desired to restrain his actions; that a man of Adams's temperament
could not meet such a situation with bonhomie, but would read into
Vergennes's attitude a threat to American independence after the war.
Then followed the series of misadvised letters between Vergennes and
Adams.

The whole incident seems to have arisen because a man, who was

not a diplomat by nature but

~no

was a sincere patriot, felt that

France through her foreign minister was assuming an over-weening
influence over his country.
decided to

11

In such a situation, this man, John Adams,

put teeth" into America's independence from all countries,

including France.

Unfortunately, his course of action weakened his

reputation as a diplomat, but fortunately its outcome was felicitous
to the interests of his country.
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